Full-scale Transport Controlled Impact Demonstration Program by unknown
DOTIFAAICT-87110
FAA Technical Center
Atlantic City International Airport
N.J. 08405
/ / . /
//J - ;:-_ - 7--,4,/
• I
Summary Report--Full-
Scale Transport Controlled
Impact Demonstration Program
_NASA-TR-89642) FULL-SCALE TRANSPOR_
CONTROLLED IMPACt DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM
Final Summary Report _N&SA) 82 p AvaiL:
NTIS HC AOS/MF A01 CS&L '3|C
G3/03
N88- 100 21
Unclas
010_537
September 1987
Final Report
This document is available to the U.S. public
through the National Technical Information
Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161.
US.Deportment of Transportation
Federal Aviation Administration
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19880000639 2020-03-20T08:48:32+00:00Z
NOTICE
This document is disseminat:ed under the sponsorship of
the DepartmenC of TransporCat:ion in the interest of
information exchanse. The United States Government
assumes no liability for the contents or use thereof.
The United States C_overnmenC does not: endorse produces
or manufacturers. Trade or manufacturer's names appear
herein solely because they are considered essent:ial Co
the object of this report.
h>IECIITIVE S1)DiARY
] ._IT RODUClTI ON
15Lir:k '/:- otmd
! U't')< P&N MANACENEb;T
'rechnica]
){P, P, <q _ 501,1 f! I1 [-
t,, ,,r..,'.-, ]"IA.'.i.,\(;}ii_il'h'gT
J'n r t: J c [ p,'nu t,':
]' f:{t )(; i',AN I >11' !, i(HE E TAT ] O N
"](_ tvt Ai r('ra _t
!,b;pe r ime l_ t s / ,qy ,_t c-r.,_•
Cround Operat 5.on_
}-] J ght Ope_:a t :i on s
I>};ACT SCENARIO
Impact Sceng)ri c,
[ l,q)a c t Scol_a zio
!,'>,f)}-k iNENT (S) /SYSTEMS
TABL2"
(}']nrmed)
(Actual)
t'E}_ F()R,_{A} , ( E
rntegratJcm, aT,J Checko_ t-
Pa£e
vii
!
i
2
4
(,
]
t!
]%
.',.1;t:ii:_.qt_n L Kerc_:_erlu (AT,IF)
(?rashwor tb_ne.q._:,./St-t'uct_-._ ] /Res't taint
Cah[o l'{re Safety; !e>:f)v_:f,*enc,<
F1_',;1._t Data :_.nd Cockpit Vo[c'e Po('orJc.r:-'
?'ll>d_t Tncident !.',ecnrder!Flecr.rtu_i,: Lc, c:,tc_-,: TYr,._¢:r,[)-(:,,:
}laz:lrdoll,'; .Materin]s Pacl::_e.<
])ata Acqu]s]t_on/])he)tograpl_{c S.y,_tem
]{emote]y Piloted VehJc].e/F]J_bt Coptra] System
F]J.}j]It S;)[et}f/F]J_ht Termin,qtJc_71 S_stem
' q-' ^ > ' ' !DE(3 CO_'ERACiI<i:(.:(;]NEERING IHOFt.(,P,,',} I.].C/V
.... , ,,H F].?F RESCUE
[,(',,;.;'i-T._4PACT (AC{:iI)},2,I q'') fN'Y),IS'CTtIA'I ]()F,/I_NA12%q I ._"
!2.I;,R(IENCY !,:VACi_IAT] O}', ])ATA
(?h;I:RVAq'] (]<t_
tRI_OEIDIN_ pAGE BLANK NOT FILIV'_
",r _,
<,)<)
L
<')6
I Ce
S ]
iiJ
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
REFERENCES
APPENDICES
A -- Participants
B -- CID Documents Index
C -- Degrader System Jet-A/AM]< Bui]dup Plan
D -- Typical Flight Plans and Schedules
E -- CID Pilot/Crew Report
F -- Distribution List
iv
Figure
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
9
10
ll
12
!3
14
15
16
17
18
19
21
22
23
24
05
LIST OF IM,USTRATIONS
CID/Boeing 720
Impact/Slideout Site
Actual Impact Site
Wing Openers
Visual Target Alignment Fence
Main Control Room
Spectrum Analysis Facility
CID Impact Flight Profiles
CID Impact Sequence
AMK B]ending
Engine/Degrader System Installation
Engine/Degrader
Degrader Control Pane]
Interior Configuration
Dummy Installation
Aircraft Structural Response
Forward Galley Installation
Aft Galley 7nstal]atJon
Overhead Compartments
Seats with Fire Blocking Layers
Burn-Through Resistant Epoxy Windows (with frame)
Burn-Through Resistant Epoxy Windnws (individual)
Tritium Light Device
Digital Flight Data Recorder Package
U.S. Navy Flight Incident Recorder/Electronic Locator
Transmitter
Page
O
i
g
In
In
2
12
15
18
21
23
_O
24
26
27
_O
30
JJ
31
?4
36
37
38
40
41
V
Figure
26
27
28
29
3O
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
48
41
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS (Continued)
Close-Up of Incident Recorder/Electronic Locator
Transmitter
Simulated Hazardous Cargo
DAS Main Pallet
Recorder Subsystem
Checkout Subsystem
Camera/Photo Floodlight Installation
RPV Ground Cockpit
Flight Control Uplink/Downl_nk Rack Installat_on
U.S. Navy P.3 "Cast-A-Glance" Aircraft
NASA Photographic Helicopter
U.S. Army Photographic Helicopter
Remote Cine-Se×tant Tracker Setup
Remote Camera Station
CFR
Post-Impact Accident Investigation
CID Fire Damage
Page
41
42
44
44
45
45
47
4a
49
_0
57
5_
L.
53
55
57
LIST OF TABLES
Table
1 Original Project Schedule -- Installation and Flight
Schedule
Project History and Schedule
Page
6
vi
EXECUTIVE S_MARY
Planning for the Full-Scale Transport Controlled Impact Demonstration (CID) bega_
in July 1980. The aircraft experiments and systems integration began in December
1983. The first full dress rehearsal took place February 29, 1984, and the CID
aircraft first flew on March 7, 1984.
In all there were 14 manned test flights prior to CID. On December I, ]984,
the remotely piloted CID aircraft took off on its final flight and impact
demonstration at Edwards AFB, California -- within 120 days of the target date
committment made to Congress in 1980.
This was the first time that a four-engine jet aircraft (Boeing 720) had been
flown successfully by remote control, it was also the first time that an
aircraft was flown solely and successfully on antimistJng kerosene fuel (AMK).
In previous flight tests, AMK was used to fuel one engine, while the other
engines had operated on conventional Jet A.
The complex CID did not perform as planned, however, the results provided much
valuable data on the antJmisting fuel and crashworthiness experi_ents. Tbe cabin
fire safety experiments in CID provided little data due to extensive fire damage.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) concluded that the CID was a survlvab]e accident. On
April 2, 1985, the two agencies reported on their pre]Imlnary find$_gs of the
joint CID undertaking to the Transportation, Aviatio,, and Materials Subcommittee
of the House Committee on Science and Technology.
Overall observation and impression of the CID operation was that it was at the
highest professional level by the entire CID team. Tbe ground team, remote
control vehicle lab/cockpit team, aeronautical test range, control room (support
operations), and Air Force support (i.e., ground, tower, CFR, etc.) performed
flawlessly. The NASA, FAA, DOD, industrly, etc., team must be complimented for
their performance in this effort.
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INTRODUCTION
The Full-Scale Transport Controlled Impact Demonstration (CID) Programwas a
joint Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA)research effort conducted on December], 1984, at the
NASA-Ames/DrydenFlight Research Facility (NASA-A/DFRF),EdwardsAir Force Base,
Ca]ifornla.
This SummaryReport is a deliverable product supporting the program Mamagement
Plan. It delineates a summaryof the total CID experiments, instr_Jmentstion/data
acquisition, telemetry, remotely pi]oted vehicle/flight control system (RPV/FCS),
systems integration, flight operations, impact demonstration, post-lmpact
investigation, and "quick-look"/prelimlnary data results. Detailed technics]
reports are scheduled to be prepared by the FAAand NASA.
BACKGROUND.
In 1980, tile FAA planned to conduct a controlled impact of a typical modern day
jet transport aircraft to demonstrate the effectiveness of the antlmlstlng
kerosene (AMK) fuel concept. While planning the AMK experiment, it became
obvious that a test of this magnitude could support various other research
experiments which would be the basis for regulatory actions or long-term research
initiatives. It appeared logical that crashworthiness/structursl/restraint and
cabin fire safety research efforts could benefit from such a _mpact
demonstration.
Therefore, the FAA invited NASA to participate in and support the crashworthiness
experimentation and flight operations of this test. The NASA-Langley Research
Center (NASA-LaRC) provided the structural crashwortblness Instrumentation and
CID program data acqlsitlon systems (DAS). The NASA-A/DFRF supported the test by
AMK, crashworthiness, and cabin f_re safety experiment integration,
instrumentation, and data acquisition integration; remote]y piloted vehicle/
flight control system (RPV/FCS) design and development; ground and flight test
operations; the subsequent impact demonstration; and data reduction and
analysis.
The Full-Scale Transport CID Program was developed and primarily based on a
culmination of FAA and NASA exhaustive laboratory, simulation, and development
tests conducted for AMK, crashworthy design features, and cabin fire safety. The
consummation of this demonstration and the other test efforts is to provide the
evidence, specifications, and criteria for consideration of ru]emaking action.
The aircraft (figure I) was a typical 4-englne jet (Boeing 720) intermediate
range design which entered airline service in the mld-1960's, but its physics]
design features and construction practices are common to U.S. and foreign
airframe manufacturers (i.e., B-707, DC-8, B-757, A-300 etc.).
The CID aircraft contained the necessary systems, components, instrumentation,
and data acqisition systems to support the AMK, crashworthiness, and fire safety
experiments. Current and new generation flight data and cockpit voice recorders
were installed. Passive and benign hazardous materials packages were located
under the galley area for this test. The RPV/FCS (ground and _irborne) were
integrated in the B720 to provide remote controlled air-to-surface impact.
DRIb-'INALpA,b'_IS
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FIGURE I. CID/BOEING 720
Engineering high-speed motion picture, video, and still cameras (airborne and
ground) provided the necessary internal and external data documentatJcn. A
flight safety termination system was provided in case of loss cf remote control.
Basically, the B-720 was unchanged from its original configuration other than
tbat necessary to integrate the systems and equipments of the experiments and
the RPV system.
The FAA's aircraft safety program, as proposed to Congress in mid-1980,
_dentified a need for a large transport crash test which would demonstrate an@
validate technology that can improve transport aircraft crash survivability
through: (i) reduced post-crash fire hazard; and (2) improved crash impact
protection.
PROGRAM, EXPERIMENTS/OBJECTIVES
TECHNICAL.
Recent advances in impact technologies and their applications for post-crash
safety provide for:
o Antimisting Kerosene Fuel (AMK)--verify that AMK can preclude ignition
of an airborne fuel release and/or suppress the ignited f_rebal] growth
characteristic upon impact and demonstrate AMK i, an operational
fuel/propulsion system.
Structure (fuselage, wing, floor)--examine structural failure
mechanismsand correlate analytical predictions; provide baseline
etal crash data to support FAAand NASAcomposite crash dynamics
research; and define dynamic floor pulse for seat/restraint system
studies.
O Seat/Restraint System--assess regulatory criteria; evaluate per-
formance of existing, improved, and new lightweight seat concepts; and
evaluate performance of new seat attachment fittings.
O Stowage Compartments/Galleys--evaluate effectiveness of existing/
improved retention means.
Analytical Modeling--valldation of FAA "KRASH" and NASA "DYCAST" models
to transport aircraft and verify predicted crash test impact loads.
Cabin Fire Safety--observe seat blocking layers, burn-through
resistant windows, and low-level emergency lights performance.
Flight Data and Cockpit Voice Recorders (FDR/CVR)--demonstrate/
evaluate performance of new >_R/CVR systems, and demonstrate
usefulness for accident investigation analysis.
Flight Incident Recorder/Electronlc Locator Transmitter (FIR/ELT)--
demonstrate/evaluate performance of the ejectable U.S. Navy/Naval Air
Test Center (NATC) system.
Hazardous Materials Package--demonstrate performance of packages in
an impact environment.
O Post-Impact (Accident) Investigation Analysls--assess adequacy of
current National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) forms and
investigation procednres.
Nemotely Piloted Vehlcle/Flight Control System (RPV/FCS)--gulde
the "unmanned" aircraft through the flight profile, activate the
onboard experiments/systems, and control the aircraft to a precise
impact target area.
MANAC EMENT.
The following were the primary managememt tasks:
o Provide program development, coordination, and implementation.
o Provide program and technical support.
PROGRAMMANAGEMENT
A Test ManagementCouncil (TMC)was established to overview CID and to assure
implementation of the participating FAAand NASAorganizations commitmentsand
responsibilities. Council representatives were from the FAATechnical Center,
NASA-LangleyResearch Center, and NASA-Ames/DrydenFlight Research Facl]Ity
management. The TMCwas the ProgramManager's route to each participating
agency's top managementfor problem solving and general project/program
reporting.
The Program Managerprovided overall program development, coordination, and
implementation coordination with all participating organizations.
PARTICIPANTS.
Participants included numerous government and industry organizations with various
program functions and responsibilities. Appendix A provides a general listing of
those organizations and individuals who contributed heavily to the success of the
CID program,
PROGRAM I_LEMENTATION
The Management Plan (reference i), by its January 1984 release, represented the
experiments and systems plans as implemented. The experlment/systems deliveries
and installations were well underway by the issue and distribution date. CID was
functioning under the NASA-A/DFRF "Basic Operations Plan" (reference 2) as
augmented by the "CID Project Operations Plan" (reference 3). A "Configuration
Management Plan" (reference 4) was implemented as early as an inlt_al wrench
applied to the B-720, experiments/systems installation and integration, checkout,
maintenance, repair/replace, etc. The "Ground Operations Plan" (reference 5)
provided the final organization and operations of the ground activities. Other
supporting documents will be identified in the appropriate subject sections.
CID documents Index (appendix B) is a listing of the working documents.
The NASA-LaRC was given the overall CID program schedule tracking responslbi]ity
whose reporting was provided in a management information (reference 6) format on
a monthly basis. This document contained comprehensive integrated/flow-charted
(logic flow networks) schedule for all aircraft, systems, experiments, tests
(ground/flight), etc., segments of the CID program activities.
Initial experiment deliveries to NASA-A/DFRF by mid-December 1983 with
Installation/integration were started in late December 1983 and were baslca]ly
completed by the end of February 1984. RPV/FCS ground checkout started in mid-
February 1984. A successful ground Combined Systems Test (CST) was conducted on
February 29, 1984, and first manned flight was conducted on March 7, 1984.
Subsequent flights were planned for April, May, and June 1984, with the final
three flights, including the impact demonstration, occurring in late July 1984.
A flight test buildup plan was initiated which was a systematic development to
assure manned flight safety and CID mission success. This systematic
development minimized risks, established system re]iabillty and performance, and
"confidence" that the CID was ready for the final unmanned mission. This meant
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not only confidence must be built up on the basic aircraft but also the AMK
degrader/engine systems, instrumentation/data acquisition/camera systems,
FDR/CVR,and the RPV/FCSconcept.
The test aircraft, experiments/systems installation, integration/checkout,
ground, and flight operations are generally discussed in the following sections.
TEST AIRCRAFT.
The test aircraft was a typical four-engine jet (Boeing 720) intermediate range
design which entered airline service in the mid-1960's. This aircraft was
purchased new by the FAA in ]960 for $4.2 million for use in trslning the
agency's jet operations inspectors. During its FAA career, it logged more thon
20,000 hours and made over 54,000 takeoffs and landings. Basically, it had come
to the end of its useful career, and was judged to be the best candidate aircr_,ft
for CID.
The physical design features and construction were common to U.S. and foreign
airframe manufacturers (i.e., Boeing 707, McDonnell Douglas DC-8, Boeing 757,
Airbus A-300, etc.). Airframe structure, cabin interiors, flight decK, se_t/
restraint systems, fuel and propulsion systems, flight control and avionic
systems were representative of the aircraft industry cross-section.
The general specifications for the Boeing 720 are:
Length
Wing Span
Empty Weight
Maximum Landing Weight
Gross Taxeoff Weight
Fuel Capacity
Flight Crew
Passengers
136.7 Feet
130.9 Feet
106,000 Pounds
175,000 Pounds
203,000 Pounds
12,]89 Gallons
(3)
(124) Normal
(113) CID Configuration
The aircraft was turned over and delivered to NASA-Ames/Dryden Flight Research
Facility in June 1981 to prepare for the CID program. During the summer of ]983,
initial interior materials, floor, and side panel removals began in order to
access areas for accelerometers, strain gages, an instrumentation/power cabling
installation. In some areas, selected side panels and materials were not
replaced; i.e., cargo compartment, fuselage ceiling, etc. Seat/restralnt systems
were replaced with the planned experiment standard/modified seat-restralnt
systems. The flight deck, flight control and avionics systems were modified for
Edwards Air Force Base operations, remote piloted vehicle, and instrumentation.
The fuel and propulsion system were modified to support the A_ degrader system.
instrumentation, and operations. Air-conditioning and pressurization
turbocompressors were removed from the engine to allow installation of the AMK
degrader system. Thermal anti-iclng systems for the wing leading edges were
eliminated. An A_ positive ignition source/dual flame generator package was
installed in the tail cone.
EXPERIMENTS/SYSTEMS INSTALLATION, INTEGRATION, AND CHECKOUT.
All modifications to the B-720 were under the jurisdiction of NASA-A/DFRF. FAA
Techncial Center, NASA-Langley Research Center (NASA-LaRC), and/or their
contractors could work on the aircraft with the appropriate NASA-A/DFRF assigned
crew chief and Chief, _ircraft Maintenance and Support Division approvals.
Various FAA, NASA, and industry contractors developed englneerJng drawings
(reference 7) for the installation and integration buildup. Responsible lead
indJviduals and points of contact were identJfied, and they in turn maintained
the required documentation revisions and necessary coordination for
configuration control (reference 4).
Installation, integration, and checkout were generally accomplished in accordance
with the CID team approved original project planned schedule (table I) and as
detailed in the NASA-LaRC prepared monthly system report (reference 6) and the
NASA-A/DFRF "Top Man Schedule." Dsily schedule of activities and events was
reported/reviewed at the Dryden Project Managers morning meeting. Once each
week, a total CID team/crew meeting was conducted to review pa_t weeks progress,
problems, solutions, etc., and the new week work item lists.
TABLE 1. ORIGINAL PROJECT SCHEDULE -- INSTALLATION AND FLIGHT SCHEDULE
FY84 FY85
0 N D J F M A M J J A S 0 N D
Hardware implementation
and installation
Ground checkout and
combined systems tests
Manned flight tests
Flight readiness reviews
Unmanned impact flight
Site analysis
Site cleanup
Reporting
!
f-
[-_
[_
As the schedule indicates, experiments and systems installatlon/integratlon began
in early December 1983. Basic aircraft compliance with FAA/manufacturer aircraft
directives (AD) had been initiated in early ]983. Sensor/Instrumentation/power
cabling was started in October 1983 with initial data acquisition system (DAS)
and high-speed motion picture camera systems installation beglnni_g in mid-
December 1983. Table 2 provides an actual project history and schedule overview.
Delivery and installation of the four AMK fuel degrader systems were delayed
based on bench testing of the first flight degrader. Corrective actions were
accomplished by the contractor for all degraders and the on-site installation
design and buildup continued. RPV (ground and airborne) systems installation and
checkout were in progress and were generally in a state to participate in the
combined systems tests (CST).
TABLE2.
Hardware implementation
and installation
Ground checkout and
combined systems tests
Manned flight tests
Flight readiness reviews
Unmanned impact flight
Site analysis
Site cleanup
Reporting
PROJECT HISTORY AND SCHEDULE
FY84 FY85
The initial CST was conducted on February 29, 1984. The DAS performed limited
checkouts, and the AMK degrader/pod system was installed but nonoperational. The
RPV system performed many of its upllnk/downlink control functions. The
aircraft/engine systems performed satisfactorily in preparation for first flight
on March 7, 1984.
On April 4, 1984, the initial degrader/engine systems operations were attempted.
The plan was to step each degrader through a systems checkout prior to
integration with an engine and ground run. Once that checkout was completed,
then integrate one degrader with a companion engine and conduct normal engine run
procedures. After a series of degrader systems only checkout attempts, the
operation was shutdown. Numerous anomalies occurred, problems corrected, and
the first degrader/engine run was successfully conducted on Aprl] II, 1984.
Flight AMK/degrader buildup plan (appendix C) provides a general insight as to
degrader/engine system checkout.
GROUND OPERATIONS.
The ground operations (reference 5) activities not only included the impact site
development but also the operational control and support (as required) over all
ground support elements participating in pre-impact, impact, a post-lmpact
activity within the operational control area for CID operations. Responsibility
for the CID impact site operations rested with the Ames/Dryden Project Manager
down to within 3 days of impact. Coordination was then transltloned to the CID
Ground Operations Manager/Convoy Commander (GOM/CC) finally at CID impact.
Impact Site. The CID test area was located on Rogers Dry Lake Jmmedlately
adjacent to the Edwards Air Force Base Precision Active Impact Range Area
(PAIRA). The impact site (figures 2 and 3) was covered with a 4- to 6-1nch deep
layer of I-i/2 inch diameter hard rock for a distance of 1,200 feet by 300 feet
wide.
J_I(;I!RE 2. TMPACT/SI,IDI_OU? SITE
FIGURE 3. ACTUAL IMPACT SITE
Ground photographic/video coverage fixed position and tracker platforms were
installed either side of the impact and slideout area. Thirty-four photographic
range poles (10 feet high) serving as photographic identification aids were
installed at the impact site. They were located at lO0-foot intervals on each
side beginning about 200 feet before the planned impact point.
Twelve low impact resistance, breakaway landing approach )ight structures, each
I0 feet tall with five lights per pole, were located every 100 feet beginning 300
feet after the impact point, six on each side of the runway, 75 feet across from
each other. They are constructed of lightweight fiberglass tubes wlth breakaway
couplings every 42 inches. These light tower's and their 60 300-watt approach
lamps serve to provide a realistic fuel ignition source.
Eight wing openers (figure 4) were located between 50 and I00 feet past the
planned impact point. Contact by tile leadlng edge of the wing will cause the
lower half of the wing opener to rotate upwards and cut into the ]o_er portion of
the wing, rupturing the fuel tanks. Each wing opener weighs approximately 400
pounds and is 8 feet by 7 feet long (blade part) by 2 feet wide. For RPV p_lot
visual target a]ignment and aiming, a black fence (figure 5) with an
international orange center was installed in front of tl,e wJ,g openers.
Operational Control. The GOM/CC was responsible for the cortro] of _]]
operations, personnel, and equipment during the fins] 3 days prior to impact, at
impact, and up through approximately T+]5 days in the CID operational control
area. The Air Force Flight Test Center (AFFTC) On-Scene Co_m_ander was
responsible for all the AFFTC/Department of Defense (DOD) resources which were
either a part of the CID operations or that which may be called into the vicinity
of the CID/720 during an emergency operation.
The Impact Site Operational Control Area was under NASA/IiSAF security control 94
hours per day beginning I week prior to impact up through approxi_ately T+I5
days. USAF Security Police were posted, sealed off access, and helicopter
searched the lakebed/sterile termination envelope area prior to engine start
through impact and a safe "all clear" signal. Entry into the control area was by
radio communications and special badging.
Aircraft, experiments, and systems operations teams supported the lakebed opera-
tions pre- and post-lmpact. Engineering photographic/video coverage teams
requried access to service, load, and set up the equipment prior to impact and
after impact to recover the film and video tape.
Official technical observers, VIP's, guests, and media personnel were assigned
designated observer areas off the lakebed and outside the termination envelope
area.
Crash fire rescue personnel and firefightlng apparatus were preposltioned at
designated locations on the lakebed outside the termination envelope area.
Standard USAF water and foam firefJghtJng vehicles were provided with a normal
crew complement. An FAA accident investigation specialist was transported with
the firefighting teams in order to check the aircraft for toxic or unsafe gases
prior to allowing the aircraft/systems safing team onboard after flre
extinguishment.
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FI{;URE 4. UIN(; ...... {:
FIGURE 5. VISUAL TARGET ALIGNMENT FENCE
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The aircraft/experiment safing team; tape, film, and experiments recovery team;
TV/photographlc documentation team; documentation research team; and the post-
impact investigation team were amongthe additional personnel requiring pre- and
post-lmpact access to the operational ares.
FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
All flight operations were conducted in accordance wlth the Dryden Basic
Operations Plan (reference 2) and the CID Project Operations Plan (reference 3).
All ground (aircraft/systems) and airborne operations were supported by the NASA
One Main Control Room and Spectrum Analysis Facility (figures 6 and 7).
Appendices C and D provide typical flight test buildup plans that were developPd
and implemented for a systematic checkout of the a_rcraft, experlments/systems,
and the RPV/FCS. The initial Flight 001 (March 7, 1984) was basically a test of
the aircraft/systems and an opportunity for the flight crew to assess the flying
qualities and systems of the aircraft, as the aircraft had not been flown since
its 1981 delivery to Dryden. Initial follow-on flights were:
Flight 002
Flight 003
Flight 004
March 15, 1984
May 3, 1984
May 9, 1984
After a number of attempts on May 17-19, 1984, to complete the degrader system
(only) ground and flight checks for Flight Numbers 005 and 006, a number of
installation induced technical deficiencies were observed; therefore, the CID
Program Manager and Dryden Project Manager shut down the operation. After a
series of CID team reviews, a work item list of approximately 13 items for the
degrader and engine systems was developed, and it was estimated that
approximately 5 weeks of work would be required to accomplish the task. On May
23, 1984, the decision was made to remove the aircraft from flight status and to
begin the work on the englne/degrader systems as well as other work identified
for instrumentation, data acquisition systems, remote control, etc.
It was then obvious that Flights 005 and 006 would be delayed and therefore
impact the planned CID date of July 28, ]984. FAA and NASA management
participated in status reviews, and a new schedule was developed. On July 10,
]984, a successful combined systems test (CST) was run with minimum anomal_e_.
Flight 005 was conducted on July 13, 1984, and a number of anomalies occurred.
Problems did occur with experiments, systems, and the old Boeing 720 aircraft.
After Flight 005, generally the flights were as follows:
Flight 006
Flight 007
Flight 008
Flight 009
Flight 010
Flight 011
Flight 012
Flight 013
Flight 014
Flight 0 15
August 7, 1984
August 17, 1984
August 28, 1984
September 18, ].984
October I, 1984
October 25, 1984
November 5, 1984
Novemboer 15, 1984
November 26, 1984
December 1, 1984
Dress Rehearsal
Final Flight Preparations
(Manned)
CID (Unmanned)
II
|FIGURE 6. MAIN CONTROL ROOM
FIGURE 7. SPECTRI_ ANALYSIS FACILITY
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To summarize the CID flights, there were 14 "manned" flights flown:
-- Total flight time: 31.4 hours
-- Total RPV time was 52.2 percent of total
-- 9 RPV takeoffs and 13 RPV landings
-- 69 CID profiles/approaches to altitudes between 150 and 200 feet
One "unmanned" flight was flown:
-- Total RPV time was 8 minutes: 54 seconds.
The final CID unmanned f]ignt (015) will be discussed in more detail in the
impact scenario (actual) and RPV/FCS summaries. Flight 015 Mission Rules
(reference 8), Operating Ri,]es (reference 9), and Flight Cards (reference ]0)
were used for Day of Flight (DOF) operations.
I_ACT SCENARIO
In the 1980-198] time frame, the FAA B-720 (N-23) transport was made available
for testing purposes to the FAA Technical Center. As orlgina]ly conceived, the
aircraft was to be primarily used for:
o Demonstrating the effectiveness of AMK in a typical impact survivable
postcrash fire environment. The decision was made to piggybac_ the AMK
experiment with additional crashworthiness experimemts which included an
instrumented structure (to validate analytlcal model predictions) and m series of
instrumented cabin and seat/restralnt systems installations.
However, recognizing that experimental incompatibility may exist, priorities were
established by the FAA Office for Aviation Standards and CID team members.
o A_dK
o Structural (Fuselage, Wing Measurements)
o Validation of Analytical Model (KRASH)
o Seats/Restraint Systems
o Seat Blocking Layers/Burn-Through Resistant Windows
o FDR/CVR's
As a part of the effort to define an acceptable impact scenario to all experlmen-
tors, a joint effort between the FAA Technical Center, NASA-LaRC, and the major
transport aircraft manufacturers was contracted to do an indepth investigation of
transport aircraft accidents. The purpose of this study was to define failure
mechanisms affecting occupant survivability in a crash environment, and to define
a range of survivable crash conditions or crash scenarios that may form a basis
for developing improved crashwortbiness design technology.
The accident data base consisted of a review of 933 worldwide transport accidents
which occurred during the years of 1959-1979. The sources of the data were the
files of the FAA, Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), NTSB, transport aircraft
manufacturers, etc. The data focused on survivable accidents only which, after
applying established criteria to the total data base, was reduced from 933
accidents to 175 survivable transport accidents (domestic: 99; foreign: 76)
delineated by operational phase, failure modes, and occupant statistics.
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The following criteria was established for statistics to be considered in this
data base: (a) Airframe survivable volume was maintained during impact and prior
to severe fire; (b) at least one occupant did not die from trauma; (c) potential
for egress was present; and (d) accident demonstrated structural or system
performance.
The scenario was derived from a detailed review of the survivable accidents data,
analytical mode] predlct_ons, and full-scale fuselage section drop testing, plus
stated experimentor requirements.
Antimistln$ Kerosene (Abe)
Compatible A_ flJe] and engiDe systems
CID performance of fuel; i.e.,
Air-to-surface impact demonstration
-- Maximum 155 knots at wing tank rupture obstructions
-- 20-100 gallons per second fuel release per e_ch single point
tank rupture
-- 4-5 second exposure after tank rupture above 100 knots
-- Decelerate to 100 knots
Verifiable positive ignition sources; i.e., engine separation,
slide-out gravel, franglb]e landing lights, etc.
Under consideration: Simulated IEnition sources; i.e., aircraft:
mounted and/or impact site
Crashworthiness
Representative of an impact survivable accident
Emulates a final approach/landing, missed approach, and/(,_
aborted takeoff
Maintain fuselage integrity
Sink rate at impact = 17 feet per second (f/s)
Vertical impact pulse prior to impact obstructions
Seat/Restraint S_ste_
Evaluate performance of existing, improved, and new lightweight
sest/fittlng concepts
Vertical sink rate at impact = 17 f/s
LongitudlnaI acceleration ( 9-10 g's) accept 4-6 $'s, or what
we could set at imspact (at floor)
Structural/Bendin$ BrldBe
Calibration of fuselage/wlng structures for comparison to
analytical models
IMPACT SCENARIO (PLANNED).
The final "unmanned" CID was to fly the flight profile (figure 8) after a series
of engine/systems/experiments ground checks. The final flight time was to last
less than 9 minutes. The aircraft will takeoff from the lakebed, climb to 2,300
feet, and circle the dry lakebed to intercept a slmulated instrument landing
system beam. At the intercept, the remote pilot on the ground sets up an
approach speed, altitude and sink rate, and begins the descent.
14
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The aircraft will descend along a glide slope at a controlled sink rate. It will
strike the prepared impact area in a nose-up attitude with the wheels retracted
and wing flaps set at 30 degrees. Almost immediately after impact, the wings
will strike a series of wing openers for the purpose of rupturing the fuel tanks
allowing fuel to be released into the airstream and creating potential fire
situation.
The aircraft then will continue along a prepared grave] surface striking six sets
of frangible approach light towers similar to those installed at commercial
airports. The aircraft is expected to come to rest 1,000 to 1,200 feet from the
i_itial impact area.
In November 1984, after numerous flights, the Flight Readiness Review (FRR)
Committee recommended a relaxation of impact requirements an@ accuracies in order
to improve the probability of enhancing the RPV pilot's impact success. Tbe CID
team reviewed the mission requirements in light of flight safety and mission
success, and implemented the following scenario:
Impact Scenario (At Impact)
Current
Requirements Implementation Con_en ts
Sink Rate 17+0 f/s 17+3 f/s Difficult
-2 -2 with
ground
effects
+5 +5
Longitudinal Velocity 150-0 kts 150-5 kts Can control
Pitch +1°+0
longitudinal Accuracy
+io+I o
+75 feet +75 ft (long)
-]25 ft (short)
Difficult
with ground
effects
Difficult
with ground
effects but
improves
probability
Lateral Accuracy +15 fet !15 feet No problem
Roll 0+1 ° 0+i o No problem
_leading +I ° +_i° No problem
The above reduces the accuracy pressures from the RPV pilot, allows him
additional mental and physical flexibility, and should not compromise CZD
mission objectives and goals.
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IMPACT SCENARIO (ACTUAL).
The remote takeoff and climbout from the lakebed appeared to have proceeded in a
relatively typical manner as compared to previous remote takeoffs. Climb-out to
racetrack intercept was normal, aud final approach intercept occurred 5 minutes:
25 seconds following takeoff rotation. (Impact occurred 2 minutes:24 seconds
following pushover.) Total flight time from brake release to _mpact was 8
minutes: 54 seconds.
The initial final descent appeared to be acceptable with typical higb pilot
workload. At about 500 feet above ground level (AGL), the aircraft began
drifting across the impact centerline from left to right. At the 260-foot AGI,
point, the aircraft was moving rapidly across the center]ine from left to rig|_t.
At this point, the pilot workload increased dramatically as he attempted to align
the aircraft with the runway centerline. The resulting series of turns, similar
to a lateral offset maneuver, resulted in roll oscillations which were continuiI1g
at impact. Peak-to-peak amplitude of the bank angle excursions were
approximately 15 degrees. At impact, the vehicle was approximately aligned with
the runway, however, offset to the right.
First contact (figure 9) with the ground was by the left outboard or Number l
engine with about a 2.0 ° nose-up attitude yawed about 13 ° left about 410 feet
short of the planned impact (X). Impact velocity was ]49 knots (TAS) w_th a sink
rate of 18.5 feet per second. Following left outboard engine contact, tbe
inboard left engine impacted followed by the bottom forward antenna and then the
fuselage forward of the wing root. The aircraft was about 50 feet to the r_ght
of centerline.
The aircraft continued its slide-out yawing about 40 ° to the ]eft. First contact
(_= 120-122 knots) with the wing opening obstructions was made by the right
inboard or Number 3 engine. This cutter entered the right hand side of the
nacelle continuing into the engine at the seventh stage of the low pressure
compressor. Postcrash analysis of the engine showed rotation was stopped in
approximately one-third of a revolution. One-tenth of a second later, ignition
occurred on the inboard or left side of the engine. The cutter also severed the
fuel and oil supply lines as well as the accessory gear case releasing
lubricating oil, hydraulic fluid, and degraded AMK. The impact also caused the
front of the engine to torque itself counterclockwise severing the fuel inlet
and discharge lines of the degrader (which is mounted in the strut doghouse are_
on the CID aircraft engine installations). The cutter then broke loose and
rotated upward into the Number 3 main fuel tank. Simultaneous to the destruction
of the Number 3 engine, two additional wing opening devices entered the wing
inboard of the Number 3 engine. The innermost opener tore through the leading
edge of the wing at the approximate center of the inactive right hand "hip" or
"cheek" tank, and proceeded through the fuselage to the main landing gear wheel
well tearing out the aircraft keel beam and the two forward main gear tires on
the left hand set.
The innermost cutter entered the wing leading edge passing through and slashing
diagonally through the lower skin and the Number 3 main fuel tank inboard _d
rib. Part of this cutter was found in the aft lower cargo compartment.
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Tbe flame which initiated at Number 3 engine continued to burn with the fire
flowing over the fuselage as the aircraft continued its slide-out with the yaw
angle constantly increasing until the aircraft came to rest. The initial fire
was the result of ignited degraded fuel lubricating oil, and hydraulic fluid.
This, added to the heat released from the destructing engine, was fed fuel
through the ruptured fuel inlet line to the degrader (for as long as the wing was
unseparated). Once the wing did separate, the fuel to the fire was still fed
through the cross-feed fuel line in the wing from the override boost pump in the
left "cheek" tank. All engines on the aircraft were operating off this tank and
boost pump during the CID.
The total time from initial contact of the Number I engine until the aircraft
came to rest was 11 seconds. The fire, as the aircraft came to rest, dimlnJshed
greatly. The total time of the fire at its fuselage-involving state was 9
seconds. At the time the fire diminished, the fuselage exterior was not visually
damaged to any degree by the flame. All paint instrumentation lines and aircraft
markings were plainly visible.
The following summary is presented for comparison of the "planned" specified
impact parameters versus the actual measurements:
Impact Scenario (At Impact)
Actual CID Measurements
Pre-CID RPV Downlink AFFTC
Requirements
Sink Rate 17+3 fps 18.45 f/s 17.3 f/s*
-2
Longitudinal Velocity
Pitch
Longitudinal Accuracy
150+5 kts 149 kts (TAS)
+io+7 o +2.0o***
+75 feet long
-125 short
151.5 kts (TAS)*
#i engine impact
left wing 410' short from
fuselage 281' short (X)
Lateral Accuracy • 15 feet
Roll
Heading
0+i o
+1 o
* Phototneodolite
* FPS-16 Radar
** Ground Measurement
*** High-speed photography
+34 ft right wreckage
(fuselage) distribu-
tion figure
13 °
13 ° left*** -4+I.
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EXPERIMENT(S)/SYSTEMS PERFORMANCE
Results of the experiments are described in the following sections. In most
areas, these are preliminary findings/results as detailed data reduction and
analysis is continuing. Key areas will prepare detailed technical reports and/or
notes on those completed analyses and findings.
ANTIMISTTNG KEROSENE (AMK).
The CID _MK experiment had two primary objectives: (1) demonstrate the
effectiveness of the antimlsting kerosene fuel concept in preventing large post-
crash fireballs, (2) verify the operational compatibility of _MK in an aircraft
fuel/propulsion system.
In November 27, 1984, the final AMK blending (figure I0) and fueling procedure
was briefed to the FRR and subseqently to the Technical Briefing with NASA-A/DFRF
senior management. The aircraft wing tank flushing was accomplished on November
28, 1984. Early on November 29, 1984, the AMK blending/fueling of the aircraft
was initiated. Approximately 11,325 gallons were loaded into the aircraft fuel
tanks. As the blending/fueling process was in progress do_ through fueling
completion, snmples of the Jet-A/AMK were being taken and tbose samples
analyzed/characterized in the fuel laboratory. Samples were taken on _
prescribed schedule up to and including early in the morning of Decmeber l,
1984. Fuel analysis results showed that the AMK in all the aircraft fuel tanks
met or exceeded the FAA AMK specification requirements.
As described in the previous section, "Impact Secnario--Actual," instead of
hitting the impact site symmetrical, the aircraft was yawed to t|_e ].eft when it
struck the ground. This yaw resulted in one of the steel wing openers at the
impact site hitting and destroying the rigl_t inboard engine prior to cutting and
severing the right wing. A large fire occurred as a result of severing
pressurized degraded A_fK fuel, oil, and hydraulic lines in t|,e engine and strut
compnrtments. Simultaneously, the wing fal]ed, pouring fuel onto the ruptured
combustor area. Other wing openers penetrated the fewer right fuselage enabTing
burning fuel to enter the aircraft.
The preliminary conclusion is that the yawed impact of the aircraft cre_ted a
situation in which a large ignition source (the destroyed Number 3 engine) was
placed right at the major fuel release point. As a reslzlt, the fuel was
immediately vaporized and burned before any signlfJcant antimis_i_g action co,_d
develop. Moreover, the left yaw angle at impact caused tbe Number 3 engine and
pylon to form s shield against the onrushing air, creating a stagnation region at
the fuel release/ignition point al]owing the fuel a longer residence time than
expected at the ignition source.
The impact demonstrated that there are conditions in which the jet fuel
aDtimisting additive used in this test is not sufficient to prevent a postcrash
fire. One example of such conditions, as illustrated by the CID, is the
destruction of an engine and _he rupture of fuel Ji_es on the e_gine pylon whic_
produced an intense ignition source near the point of fuel release. Vhi]e the
antimlsting characteristic of the fuel would have prevented forward propagation
of the fire had the ignition source been further aft, nevertheless it provided
limited, although still significant, protection in the Edwards scenario.
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Exterior and internal film documentation indicates that the resulting fire
diminished within 9 seconds. Examination of the film footage and the fuselage
shows that the fuselage sustained relatively little damage during the duration of
the fire. The reduced intensity of the fire is attributed to the antimisting
characteristic of the fuel. The fire which later damaged the interior of the
aircraft resulted from the burning of fuel which entered the fuselage during the
aircraft slideout. This fuel appeared to have entered through a forward cargo
door and/or openings made by passage of wing cutters through the fuse]n_e
structure. Researchers discovered that the fire which later damaged the n_rcr_ft
did not result from a failure of AMK. Burning fuel inside the fuselage ruptured
by wing cutters was responsible for the long-term fire which entered the cabin by
buring through the floor.
The FAA is to investigate this conclusion by duplicating the CJD impact
conditions in controlled laboratory and field tests. It is also attempting to
determine statistically, through review of past accident reports, the percentage
of "impact survivable" accidents that correspond to CID as it actually happened.
Engine/degrader system (figure Ii) operation was as planned with no anoma]_e[_.
Up to the DOF, the degrader (figures 12 and 13) operational experience wa_ _s
fo]!ows:
Jet-A Ground Run/Tests
Jet-A Flight Tests
14.3 hours
12.7 hours
27.0 hours
A>_ Ground Run/Tests
AMK Flight Tests
DOF Run Times
7.1 hours
4.0 hours
ll.1 hours
A}_ (;round Run
C]D Flight
0.7 hours (40 minutes)
_0.2 hours (_ mlnutes:54 seco,ds)
0.9 hours
The degraders were each started first and then the companion engine brought up to
idle. Degrader operation was a nominal 21K RPM and englne(s) idle at _ 66 to 67
percent N 2. At impact, degrader speed was _ 21K RPM and engipe speed at 74 to 77
percent N 2. All degrader/engine systems performed f]nw]e_s]y. Total fuel
consumed estimated at 1,191 gallons.
.q i •CRASUWORTHINE_ S/STRUCI"dRAL/RESTRAINT
Crashworthiness refers to the ability of tbe aircraft fuselage, floor structure,
and seat/restraint systems to protect the passengers and crew in a typical
landing or takeoff accident. A review of past accidents has shown that
occupants have received serious or fatal injuries in accidents that have been
termed survivable. A "survivable" accident is defined as one in which the
airframe, seat/restraint system, and cabin environmcnt remain reasonably intact,
and the impact forces experienced by the occupants are within the ]_mits of human
tolerance.
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FIGURE ii. ENGINE/DEGRADER SYSTEM INSTALLATION
FIGURE 12. ENGINE/DEDRADER
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The CID was expected to yield data that will help researchers obtain a better
understanding of aircraft structure response to various crash loads.
Accelerometers and strain gages were installed at 175 points in the aircraft
wing, fuselage, floor, and galley/stowage compartment areas with an equal number
of sensors in the seat/restraint systems and the dummies that occupied those
seats. These sensors would be used to obtain accelerations and transmitted loads
during impact and slldeout. Information from those sensors were taped by
onboard recording equipment and also transmitted directly to the ground control
center for recording at that location. Additional data was collected by 11 high-
speed cameras strategically located in the aircraft cabin and cockpit.
The interior of the aircraft was configured (figure 14) much llke a typical
passenger Jet except for the instrumentation and other special test equipment.
there were a total of 75 seats, almost all of which were occupied by human-like
dummies (figure 15). There were 13 instrumented anthropomorphic adult dummies
which represented I] passengers, I pilot, and I flight attendent.
Instrumentation did include accelerometers installed in the head, thorax, a_d
pelvic locations. The remainder were noninstrumented adult dummies with one
noninstrumented child dummy. Many of the seats and adjoining floor structure
also contained multiple accelerometer installation.
o Structural (Fuselage, Wins, Floor)
The structural experiment consisted of matching the analytical pre-
dictions of the fuselage deformatlon/failures, etc., with the post-
impact structural damage and subsequently establishing criteria which
addresses the variable impact of metal structures. The criteria will be
established on the basis of a validated model and will be obtained from
the application of this model to a matrix of aircraft configurations and
crash conditions in which floor pulses and optimum seat/restratlnt system
designs can be identified.
As described in the "Analytical Modeling" section, an unsymmetrical
yaw/roll condition wss introduced which will necessitate remodeling
(change to symmetrical model) of the CID impact. Most important,
however, is the loss of posttest evidence due to the unexpected
wing opener damage and fire which destroyed the ability to correlate
actual ground impact deformatlon/damage with predicted results.
With results obtained from the revised unsymmetrical model and
available postcrash structural information (also supporting drop
test data), a correlation of information will be developed. FAA
and NASA future reports will provide the detailed technical
analysis and results.
o Seat/Restraint System Experiments
The seat/restraint system experiments did include improved seat-
track attachment devices and energy-absorbing devices installed as
part of the seat leg structure and seatbelt/seat-pan structure. In
almost all cases, the modified seats were located next to a standard
seat of the same basic design so researchers could assess the benefits
of the modifications. Other experiments included an evaluation of
rear facing seats and a newly-deslgned child restraint system.
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The CID multiple type restraint system experiments consisted of
13 standard and 14 modified crew/passenger seat designs (FAA/NASA/
French) containing 13 instrumented and 60 noninstrumented dummies.
T_,e instrumentation (seat and dummies) included 168 accelerometer/
load cell data channels. The CID performance of the occupied
standard seats (meeting minimum static loads of 9g forward, 1.5g
side, 4.5g down, and 2g up) would be compared to the performance
of the modified seats. The FAA seat modifications (featuring energy-
absorbing stroking devices and improved seat-track fittings) were
designed and tested to meet peak dynamic loads of 18g forward, 10g
side, lOg down, and 6g up in the 35/50 feet per second velocity
change range.
Post-impact examination revealed that ]5 standard/modified seats
show no structural deformation while two standard seats had minor
deformation being directly involved in the fuselage cutter damage.
The remaining i0 seats, including two NASA designs and one French
design, were destroyed by the fire.
Based upon observed test film and except for the two seats directly
involved in the fuselage wing opener damage, tbe CJD impact loads
appeared to be less than either the standard/modified seat design
strengths. Instrumented seat/dummy data Is currently being ana-
lyzed to complete this performance assessment.
Preliminary data (figure 16) revealed the following impact pulses--g
forces as a function of time. (Data is currently being analyzed for
completness and accuracy.)
The floor values:
In the "cockpit" were:
Vertlcsl
Longitudinal
Lateral
]4 for 0._ seconds
2.6 for 0.14 seconds
4.9 for 0.14 seconds
In the forward cabin:
Vertical
Longitudinal
l,atera]
6.0 for 0.14 seconds
].6 for 0.20 seconds
2.4 for 0.18 seconds
Over the wing box:
Vertical
Longitudinal
Lateral
5.5 for 0.14 seconds
3.5 for 0.14 seconds
2.0 for 0.11 seconds
In the back part of the cabin:
Vertical
Longitudinal
Lateral
3.0 for 0.I0 seconds
5.0 for 0.14 seconds
2.0 for 0.09 seconds
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Stowase/Galleys Compartments
Researchers planned to evaluate the affect of crash loads on
galleys and stowage areas because investigation of past accidents
has shown that passengers have been injured or have had difficulty
evacuating an aircraft due to improperly or inadequately restrained
galley equipment and/or passenger carry-on items. Standard
restraint systems were tested in both the galleys (figures 17 and
18) and overhead compartments (figure 19), and the results will be
applied as necessary in the development of new design criteria.
The CID stowage and galley compartment experiments consisted of two
galley modules (filled to volume capacity) located in the forward
starboard side of the aircraft and two overhead stowage compartments
(filled to capacity weight) mounted aft the galley modules. While
the galleys were not instrumented, accelerometers were installed at
nearby structural support areas. The overhead occupant compartment
supports were instrumented with three load cells and a traix
acce]erometer installed on one of two 75-pound test weights.
FIGURE 17. FORWARD GALLEY INSTALI,AT]ON
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FIGURE 18. AFT GALLEY INSTALLATION
FIGURE ]9. OVERHEAD COMPARTMENTS
31
As observed on film, during the initial ground impact, one overhead compartment
door opened while both the galley modules stayed intact, including their internal
contents. Post-impact examination showed that fire had destroyed one overhead
compartment and partially destroyed the other. The forward galley showed partial
fire damage while the aft galley, including contents, showed minor damage (mainly
soot).
Based upon the observed film and posttest examination, the C]D impact loads
appemred to be less than the design strengths of both the galleys and overhead
compartment restraint means. The inadvertent opening of the overhead compartment
doors must be further assessed.
o Analytical Modeling
Data collected during the demonstration will be used t_ validate
computer modeling programs called "KRASH" and "DYCAST." KRASH, f_r
example, has been used extensively in evaluating the design
characteristics of small aircraft and helicopter structures to determine
their crashworthiness capabilities. Researchers used KRASH and DYCAST to
simulate the controlled impact demonstration. These simulations t_en
_ill be compared with the actual results of the demonstratJen,
providing a data base from w1_ich a generic mode] will be developed for
possible application to future transport aircraft designs.
Both the lump mass FAA KRASH and finite element NASA DYCAST models were
used to predict the structural behavior of CID aircraft during condition
of a severe/survivable impact. At the prescribed alr-to-ground impact
conditions of 17 feet per second (f/s) descent, 3-I/2-to 4-de_ree pitch,
]50 knots ground speed, and with zero roll/yaw angles, the models
predicted vertical loads in the ]dg peak ramge and horizontal] loads in
the 6 to 9g range, with minor fuselage ruptL]re and floor deformation.
]'he actual impact involved the additional yaw/roll conditions whieb
resulted in a change to the predicted values obtained from the ana-
lytical models. Both models were developed on the basis of a
symmetrical impact without lateral loads induced by the unexpected
high yaw and roll angles.)
It is believed that the additional lateral ]oa(Ts may not have sig-
nificantly affected the peak vertical and ]ong_tu(lina] responses
predicted by the analytical models. However, to support this position,
an unsymmetrical model (KRASH) will be developed which con- aiders the
actual CID impact condition with the additional lateral loads.
Instrumented CID data is being analyzed. These data will be evaluated
against the results of an unsymmetrical KRAS_ mode] to satisfy above
objectives.
CABIN FIRE SAFE]_" EXPERIMPINTS.
The use of A_ in the demonstration was expected to preclude or rLinimize the
fireball that might otherwise engulf the test aircraft, penetrate the fuselage,
and ignite interior materials like seats and wall panelings. However,
researchers did incorporate several experiments aimed at preventing or retarding
the spread of flames into and within the cabin, should fire occur.
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o Seat Blocking Layers
Fire-blocking layers (figure 20) were selectively installed on
approximately 50 percent of the passenger seats. Extensive
laboratory experiments already have shown that these fire-
blocking layers are effective in retarding the spread of flames,
and FAA is taking regulatory action to require them on all airlines.
Seat cushion fire-blocking layers are fire-resistaut fabrics which
encase the urethane foam cushions. Baslcally, the blocking-layer
material inhibits or prevents the urethane foam from burning.
Extensive full-scale (C-133) testing and evaluation have proven the
value of seat cushion fire-bolocking layers in delaying the onset of
flashover during post-crash cabin fires, and preventing inf]ight _d
ramp fires when a seat is the initial target of the ignition source.
One type of effective blocking layer is Norfab ® , an aluminized
blended fabric. Norfab was used on 32 (11 rows) of a total of
68 (2B rows) individual seats on the CID test aircraft. The fire-
blocked seats (rows) were positioned alternately with standard seats
(rows) so that a visual comparison of fire damage could be performed
in the event of a cabin fire. No instrumentation other than h_gb-
speed movie cameras was employed because the probabl]Ity ef a fire
was considered to be mJnlma].
The intense cabin fire gutted most of the passenger seats. However,
the cabin area from the center wing station to the trailing edge of
the wing was in a burned condition that permitted visual and physi-
cal comparisons of fire damage.
It was noted that on the standard seats, fire had burned away tile
outer fabric, melted the foam completely from the headrest area,
and in most cases, melted the outer fabric and foam from the
back-rest areas--extending downward to seat level. In all cases,
the fire-blocked seats were in superior condition. Although the
finished outer fabric was burned away, the Norfab aluminized
blocking material was in place and unburned. In some cases, the
aluminized surface appeared in new condition. When the headrest
areas were hand squeezed, it was noted that the underlying foam
was firm and resilient. Greater fire damage was also observed on
the walls and ceiling areas of the cabin both above and adjacent to
the nonblocked seats as compared to those areas adjacent to
fire-blocked seats.
Tbe fire-blocked seats performed in a manner consistent with
the results obtained in component and large-scale testing by providing
resistance to fire growth.
A new flammability standard for seat cushions was enacted by the
FAA on November 26, 1984, which requires the installation of fire-
blocking layers over a 3-year period from this effective date.
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FIGURE 20. SEATS WITH FIRE BLOCKING LAYERS
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Burn-Through Resistant Inner Window Panes
The second experiment was the selective use of burn-through resis-
tant epoxy windows (figures 21 and 22).
The advanced window contains an improved inner pane which was
developed by NASA and is referred to as EX 112; the improved window
resistance to fires of this type provides additions] burn-through
that would normally be experienced with post-crash external fires.
Full-scale testing at the FAA Tech, Jcal Center, using a C-133 air-
frame section permitted the comparison of the conventionally
stretched acrylic window and the EX i]2 advanced window in side-by-
side exposure to external fuel fires. The advanced window provided
approximately 60 seconds of additional time before burnthrough
compared to the conventional window.
A total of 26 burn-through resistant improved inner pane (EX 112)
windows were installed on the aircraft. They were alternately
installed with standard inner pane windows, 13 on each side of the
aircraft starting at the rear most window and progressing in the
forward direction. This positioned the forward-most panels _t
approximately mid-wing. The alternate installat_on was selected
for visual comparative purposes in the event that a post-crash
external fuel fire occurred.
The damage sustained by the aircraft resulted in a fuel fire under
'the aircraft and inside tbe cargo compartments. Evidence suggests
that fire penetration was through the floor, except possibly for sn
area forward of the wing where all the windows were of the conven-
tional type.
In the window string on the right side of the aircraft, tbree of
the improved inner panes and two of the standard inner panes were
intact. The window string on the left side contained a siml]ar
count. All of these windows were in series just aft of the trail-
ing edge of each wing.
Due to the intensity and duration of the fire, all of the other
windows in each series were melted out or distorted. No judgment
could be made by visually comparing the remaining inner panes.
The characteristics of the uncontrolled fire, and particularly the
fact that the fire penetrated the cabin primarl]y by burning up
through the floor, and the damage to the test article did not
result in any evidence of differences in burn-through resistance
between conventional and advanced windows.
Low-Level Emersency Lishtin$
Low-level emergency lighting devices (tritium) were selectively
installed on a number of seats which were located on the seat arms
next to the aisle. These were to be observed for performance during
impact.
35
OI_GINAI_ PAGE TS
OE l_:)O_-: QUALITY
FIGURE 2l. BURN-T_IR:_[:(;tt ;:.I:S1STANT I:()P):Y W[NDOI_S (:_'ITR: FRAM:E)
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Floor proximity lighting can provide escape-route guidance to
passengers and crew members in a smoke-filled cabin environment
that would obscure ceiling-mounted lighting. FAA extensive fire
testing and evacuation studies with human subjects in a theatrical
environment have proven the effectiveness of floor proximity
lighting.
Twenty-five Tritium lights (figure 23) were installed on the aircraft.
total of 8 aisle seats were selected throughout the cabin, and a
light was installed on the top of the armrest, the side, and the
rear. An additional light was installed on a ninth armrest. Two
different types of two-part adhesives were used in mounting the
lights to the armrests.
A
FIGURE 23. TRITIUM LIGHT DEVICE
Only three tritium lights remained bonded to two seats (two on one
seat and one on another). No additional lights were found on the
floor or in the floor debris. Fire consumed the missing lights in
an environment beyond the point of occupant survivability.
All lights should be mechanically fastened to maximize their time
of usefulness. A standard for floor proximity lighting was enacted
by the FAA on November 26, 1984, which requires compliance by the
U.S. fleet within 2 years from this effective date.
FLIGHT DATA AND COCKPIT VOICE RECORDERS.
The CID also provided a unique opportunity to evaluate the usefulness of current
and advanced technology flight data recorders (FDR's), cockpit voice recorders
(CVR's), and special sensors since tb _ information obtained from these systems
could then be compared with the data acquired from the various other onboard
38
experiments and flight data recording systems. The results could then increase
our understanding of the adequacy and usefulness of FDR's and CVR's in postcrash
aircraft accident investigations, particularly with regard to occupant impact
survivability determination and aircraft performance analysis on impact.
Presently, FAA requires both types of recorders on all air carrier aircraft as an
accident investigation tool. The newer FDR's record a variety of data such as
heading, pressure altitude, airspeed, normal acceleration, pitch and roll
attitude, and longitudinal and lateral acceleration--all on a time base that
permits investigators to reconstruct the flight path and impact conditions. The
CVR's record crew conversations and other cockpit and external sounds on a
continuous 30-minute tape.
Flight data recorders to be used in the CID demonstration included the aircraft's
original analog signal unit (Sunstrand), which records limited information on a
foil roll, and advanced digital systems supplied by various manufacturers.
Three state-of-the-art digital flight data recorders (DFDR's) (Fairchild,
Lockheed, Sundstrand), one Lear Siegler (LSI) solld-state memory FDR, and one CVR
(Fairchild) were installed (figure 24) in the aft cabin area along with a special
Flight Data Acquisition Unit (FDAU), signal conditioning unit (Teledyne), and
special sensors to provide unique signals on aircraft performance to the DFDR's.
The LSI FDR was not to record data, having a prerecorded data set stored, but
was being demonstrated primarily for survivability. The existing B-720 fol]
recorder was refurbished by Suudstrand and a new foil recording medium was
installed, and the FDR was reinstalled in the aircraft.
All FDR systems and sensors were installed and operated as planned. The three
DFDR's, the foil recorder, and the CVR, although subjected to extreme fire
generated heat and molten aluminum impingement, did have their respective
recording mediums survive, and the tapes were subsequently processed and analyzed
by both NTSB and the respective manufactures. The LSI FDR was subsequently
checked by LSI to determine extent of unit to imternal fire damage, if any, and
was found to have the prerecorded data set intact and useable.
Overall, the experiment was a success. Sampling rates for certain signals were
found to be definitely too low, particularly for the pitch, roll, and
acceleration signals, although the programmed rates were in accordance wltb
applicable Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR's) which obviously must be revised.
Impact and post-impact data is difficult to obtain with present DFDR's because of
their design, which permits data loss during recording under relatively high, but
humanly survivable, deceleration load factors. This happened in this case to all
three DFDR's during impact.
FLIGHT INCIDENT RECORDER/ELECTRONIC LOCATOR TRANSMITTER.
Also tested was a uniquely deployable Flight Incident Recorder (FIR)/Electronic
Locator Transmitter (ELT) provided by the Naval Air Test Center (NATC). It was
mounted (figures 25 and 26) in the vertical stabilizer and fired in the air on
impact. It was to land away from the aircraft wreckage, thus assuring its
survivability.
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FIGURE 25,
U.S. NAVY FLIGHT INCIDENT RECORDER/ELECTRONIC LOCATORTRANSMITTER
/
FIGURE 26. CI,OSE-UP OF INCIDENT RECORDER ELECTRONIC LOCATOR
TRANSMITTER
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The Nave/Canadian Forces joint experiment contained a prototype solid-state
FIR/ELT that was installed to test the ejection/separation characteristics in a
crash environment. The FIR contained preprogrammed data and was not actively
interconnected with aircraft sensors. ELT (radio beacon) and visual marker
strobe (_!S) operation and survivability were to be investigated.
The FIR/ELT ejected when the B-720 decelerated to a stop. The unit was found
approximately 15 feet from the vertical stabilizer dorsal fin. The unit did not
eject earlier (at impact) clue to the nose frangible switch (one of two) which did
not break (under fuselage switch triggered ejection). The aircraft's left yaw
during slideout and AMK flame pressure on the right side of the vertical
stabilizer tended to hold the FTR/EI,T airfoil Jn the dorsal fin mountJT, g tray
until the aircraft came to rest.
FIR data did survJve (no bit drop-out) and w_i,_;in an operable condition, the FIT
radio becon (both 121.5 mHz and 243.0 mHz) transmitted for less than 10 seconds
after ejection. The unit failed due to impact fluids (fuel, CFR foam, etc.)
shorting out a curcuit board. The VMS operated for some period of time after
ejection. The plastic covers were blackened by the ensuing fire.
HAZARDOUS MATERIAL PACKAGES.
Dow Chemical and Lawrence Packing (figure 27) provided pint and quart packaF, es
which had been filled with a scent jelled water material--nor_r,nning (the je]1_np,
m,_terial was an iPert acry.]ic copo]ymer). These p_ck,_ges were located _n the
forward lower cargo galley near floor positioned acce]erometers in order to
acquire load data. No specia] instrumentation was provided.
FI(;URE 27. S]MIiLAT]D HAZARDOUS CARGO
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The experiment represented a series of 15 hazardous material packages (filled
with multiple metal containers of nonhazardous jelled water) placed within the
lower forward galley compartment.
During the period in which the firemen entered the aircraft galley area, smoke
was coming from the lower galley compartment due to the lower cargo compartment
fire. The fire men axed into the compartment, retrieved the burning packages,
and threw them outside of the forward right-hand exit.
During the posttest examination, none of the packages that were intact and not
affected by the firemen's axe and/or from being dropped outside the aircraft
appeared to have been damaged during the aircraft ground impact, the transmitted
impact loads appeard low.
Upon completion of the analysis of the instrumentation data obtained from the
galley area, the actual dynamic loads transmitted to the hazardous mster_a]
packages will be identified.
DATA ACQUISITION/PHOTOGRAPHIC SYSTEM.
The floor plan of the CID aircraft is as presented in figure ]4. Instrumentation
hardware consisted of DAS pallets (two sets located for and aft) per figure 28,
recorded subsystem (figure 29), four power pallets (cameras/lights), chec_olJt
system (figure 30), 10 cameras and associated lights (figure 31).
NASA-LaRC developed the complete instrumentation/data acquisition system for the
CID crashwortbiness/crash behavior experiments. The DAS, as developed, included
two independent systems, each capable of collecting and processing data from ]80
sensors. The DAS signal conditioning units had 30 channels per unit. There were
six of these systems in each DAS for a total of 180 channels of which 176 were
used for data and the balance for system monitoring. The data from each DAS
was transferred directly to two onboard 14-channel tape recorders, then
simultaneously transmitted air-to-surface via four telemetry systems and recorded
at the ground receiver control station.
The overall performance of the DAS and onboard photographic systems was
excellent. At impact, 97 percent of the transducers/sensors were active, and all
I0 cameras functioned properly. The DAS/photographic systems were enclosed in
thermal insulation which prevented fire damage to all onboard recorded
information. The onboard film provided unique insight into the reaction of the
seat/dummy systems, and propagation of fire and smoke in the aircraft interior.
REMOTELY PILOTED VEHICLE/FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM.
The remote flight control and guidance system was developed for CID in order to
conduct a remote aircraft alr-to-surface impact (representing a near real-world
crash situation) with the designated experiments and supporting systems. The
NASA-A/DFRF was selected for its role in the CID program because of its
experience in flying remotely piloted research vehicles (RPRV) and its associated
physical facilities.
The RPRV technique was developed by NASA-A/DFRF in the early 1970's as a means of
flight testing experimental aircraft and advanced technologies in a far less
hazardous manner. This technique allows a pilot sitting in a ground cockpit
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(figure 32) to fly an airplane using telemetry and radar. Flight control
commands are sent electronically from the ground cockpit to the aircraft (figure
33), and flight information is returned in the same manner.
The RVP technique differs from conventional remotely piloted aircraft because it
permits the pilot to fly precise test maneuvers instead of merely guiding the
aircraft from point to point.
The B-720 was the largest remotely piloted research vehicle ever flown. Flight
commands for such functions as engine throttles, elevators, ailerons, flaps,
rudder, landing gear, brakes, nose wheel steering, and others were sent from the
ground cockpit to the aircraft via an uplink system. Commands for the elevators,
ailerons, and rudders which provide direct flight path control are fed through
the onboard autopilot system. The other functions are fed directly to the
appropriate system.
Flight information such as engine pressure ratio, exhaust gas temperature, RPM,
fuel flow, and flight navigational information such as heading, attitude,
altitude, and airspeed was returned to the ground cockpit using a dog, link
system.
A series of operating rules for the final "unmanned" CID approach to impact were
implemented as follows:
i. From bra_e release down to 400 feet on final approach, any e_per-
mentor or systems support lead can call a "go-around" and RPV pilot
Initlates the go-around per normal procedures. During go-around,
program/project management reviews problem and determines (base8
on problem) if another impact attempt is in order or abort to land.
This decision directed to RPV pilot (appendix E).
2. Between 400 feet down to 150 feet on final approach, _ RPV pilot
can call a go-around based on his impact accuracy assessment.
. From 150 feet to impact, turn on photo batteries, DAS recorders
and cameras, and the JPL lakebed camera system. RPV pilot must
continue to impact.
FLIGNT SAFETY/FLIGHT TERMINATION SYSTEM.
In the event that the ground-based RPV cockpit had lost the ability to control
the aircraft, or in the event of an onboard flight control system failure, the
flight termination system was to be activated to return the aircraft to an
uncontrolled ground impact within the designated CID sterile lakebed area. The
CID profile/sterile area was void of humans and was basically a barren lakebed
within the designated CID boundaries. Tbe program plan was to fly the unmanned
aircraft at a specified speed and rate of descent into the prepared impact area
under the control of an RPV pilot located in the ground cockpit at NASA-A/DFRF.
In the event of an onboard failure or that the ground-based pilot lost the
ability to control the aircraft, a separate and independent ground command radio
link was to be used to terminate the flight. The aircraft's throttles were to be
automatically retarded to idle and the aircraft turned into a steep right-hand
spiraling descent to the ground. Engines i, 3, and 4 were to be shutdown
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immediately with engine 2 shutting down 25 seconds later. Landing gear was to
be lowered and the stabilizer commanded to go to leading edge up. (There was no
destruct system onboard the aircraft.) The flight termination system was not
activated as the RPV system and aircraft performed as planned.
ENGINEERING PUOTOGRAPHIC/VIDEO COVERAGFi
The CID program developed a total motion/stil] fJ]m and video documentation of
the aircraft experiments, insta]lation/integratJon, flight operations, and
controlled impact demonstration. Ground cameras documented all of the
appropriate portions of the total flight profile and impact scenario through
slideout deceleration to a stop. Airborne cameras documented all of tbe
appropriate portions of the total flight profile and impact scenario through
slideout deceleration to a stop.
o Airborne Photographic and Video Coverage
The airborne black and white and color video nose cameras were primarily
assigned to the RPV pilot guidance and control Jn the ground cockpit. A
total of II high-speed engineering film cameras were strategically
located in the passenger bin and crew cockpit to acquire dummy impact
response. A high-speed film camera was mounted in the nose of the
aircraft as was one mounted in the top of the vertical stabl]Jzer, also
in the cockpit overlooking the pilot in his view of the wind screen by
the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL). Two helicopters (Army and NASA)
provided airborne film and still coverage prior to impact through
slideout to eventual aircraft rest. A Navy P-3 "CAST-A-CLANCE" aircraft
(figure 34) positioned itself above the CID aircraft and two helicopters
(figures 35 and 36) to acquire total CID profile film and video coverage.
FIGURE 34. Wl 11U.S. NA\rY P.3 CAST-A-GLANCE AIRCRAFT
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FIGURE 35. NASA PHOTOGRAPHIC HELICOPTER
FIGURE 36. U.S. ARMY PHOTOGRAPHIC HELICOPTER
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o Ground Photographic and Video Coverase
A ground photographic/video coverage system (figures 37 and 38) was set
up around the impact site perimeter by JPL. Comprehensive remote file,
video, infrared, specialty, and documentary camera ( _ 100) systems were
in place and operated prior to impact through deceleration to rest.
These systems were time correlated with airborne and ground
instrumentation/photographic and v_deo systems.
CRASH FIRE RESCUE
The principal objective of the crash fire rescue (CFR) service is to save lives
in an aircraft accident by establishing a fire-free evacuation route for
occupants. The most important factors bearing on effective rescue are the
training received, the effectiveness of the equipment, and the response time.
The equipment responding to the CID site comprised a mix of P-2, P-4, P-10, P-13
USAF vehicles, and an F-6 foamer. The B-720 aircraft is served by ]nde_ C
airports requiring a minimum of 2,100 gallons of water for foam production
(AFFF), two foam trucks, and one rapid intervention vehicle (RIV). The practica]
critical fire area for Index C airports is 10,539 square feet. Employing proper
firefighting techniques, ]0,539 square feet of fire surface can be controlled (90
percent covered by foam) in 60 seconds and extinguished in 90 seconds.
Description of Events. Tbe response time of the CFR to CID impact was
approximately 90 seconds. Response time is the total elapsed t_me from the
notification of the CFE to move out (alarm) to the first effective fire
intervention (agent discharge) at the accident site. A response t_me of 2
minutes is the recommended objective of both the 7CAO and NFPA.
The major pool fire (figure 39) on the ]eft side of the fuselege was estimated to
be 6,500 square feet. This fire was controlled with foam in 45 seconds after the
initial discharge. A narrow but intense fire burning along and under the right
side of the fuselage was attacked by two foam trucks from the front of the
aircraft. The rapid control of the fire on the left side of the fuselage
protected the left wing, which contained its original load of AMK, from fire
involvement.
After obtaining control of the fire on the left side of the fuselage, the rescue
crews entered the two main cabin doors with portable hose lines equipped w_th
variable pattern spray nozzles. At this time, the temperature and smoke in the
cabin were considered nonsurvivable to occupants. These envlronmenta] conditions
were sustained by a pool of AMK which had entered the baggage compartment through
a rupture in the fuselage during slldeout. Since this fire was below the cabin
floor, it was not readily accessible to the firefighters in the cabin nor from
outside the fuselage.
Accident experience and full-scale fire tests conducted at the FAA Technical
Center have shown that well established interior fuselage fires have been
virtually unextinguishable by the rescue and firefighting services.
Consequently, very large quantities of extinguishing agents were consumed _n an
effort to extinguish interior fires, control small external fires, and "cool"
the fuselage. The USAF A/S32P-13 vehicle containing 507 pounds of Ha]on 1211 was
equipped with the aircraft skin pen@trator nozzle and employed to extinguish some
of the "hidden" interior fires.
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The quantities of firefighting agents dispensed comprised 34,000 gallons of
water; 1,300 gallons of AFFF; and 2,000 pounds of Halon 1211. This enormous
quantity of agents required mdltiple resupply efforts during the course of fire
extinguishment.
Conclusions
i. The response time of CFR (90 seconds) was below that recommended by the
ICAO and NFPA (2 minutes).
2. Control of the major pool fire (6,500 square feet) required 45 seconds
which was below that recommended by FAA, ICAO, and NFPA.
3. The firefightJng vehicles with agents responding to the C]D were ip
large excess over that required in FAR Part 134.49 for Index C airports.
4. The burning AMK which entered in the cargo hold was the principal cause
of the burnout of the cabin interior.
5. The single skin penetrator nozzle was not adequate to dispense
effectively the agents required to extinguish the large AMK fire in the cargo
hold.
6. CFR crew report stated that the hidden source of the fire was not
diagnosed soon enough.
7. Based upon photographic coverage, it was evident that better
coordination between the fireflghting crews and command personnel would haw.
improved the effectiveness of the CFR mission.
POST-IMPACT (ACCIDENT) INVESTIGATION/ANALYSIS
At the conclusion of tlle CID, FAA conducted a "formal" full-scale accident
investigation and analysis. An accident investigation team composed of
specialist in the areas of aircraft performance, structures, propulsion, human
factors, operations, and crash fire rescue handled this effort. The team (figure
40) was formed with members from FAA, NASA, DOD, and private industry.
Investigative groups were to be formed as required by NTSB directives and report
each day to the FAA Investigator-In-Charge (IIC) on the progress in their
respective groups.
The purpose of this experiment was to assess the adequacy of the current accident
reporting forms, investigative procedures, documentation, analyses, and reporting
requirements. The analyses will also include a readout of the flight data and
cockpit voice recorders, and comparison of this information with that obtained
from various onboard flight data monitoring systems. The results wl]l be made
available for use in refining accident investigation techr, iques and procedures.
The CID documentation research and the investigative team met 2 days after the B-
720 CID, and plans and procedures formulated. The on-site investigation was, for
all practical purposes, completed within 5 days after initiation and group
factual reports were being prepared by group chairmen.
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The experiment, _nitially proposed and pursued by the FAA personnel, was a
success in that it was enthusiastically received and was conducted by
professional personnel with recognized expertise in required disciplines for this
type effort. Because of the unforeseen catastrophic fire damage (figure 41) and
wing openers damage to the aircraft, the investigation proved to be more of
challenge to and which was met by the investigators.
A detai]ed integrated report of the group factual reports is to be available.
EMERGENCY EVACUATION DATA
Investigation has revealed that the internal fire originated from fuel fires in
the lower areas of the fuselage; that is, the cargo compartments below the cobie
floor. A review of onboard film coverage by II cameras during the slideout of
the aircraft revealed rapid buildup of smoke. Tbe average for cameras forward
of the circumferential structure crack was approximately 5 seconds from slideout
complete until complete smoke obscuration, and approximately 20 seconds for the
aft section of the aircraft. It has been determined that sidewall cargo liners
were not in place for the forward and aft car So areas, and this was the likely
reason for such fast smoke obscuratJon.
At this time, the best estimate is that 23 to 25 percent of a full compleme_t of
113 people may have escaped from the CID aircraft. The total includes a limited
quantity of evacuees from the cabin area forward of the c_rcumferential brea_ and
a greater number of evacuees from the area aft of the break.
Evacuation from the cabin is based on the following major considerations:
-- The only usable exit was the ].eft forward door (front right galley door
and overwing exits blocked by external fire).
-- Approximately 5 seconds of time from slideout to complete smoke
obscuratio_ (based on onboard cameras).
-- In spite of dense smoke, crew members would instinctively locate forward
door, and passengers would move toward door used for aircraft entry.
-- Assuming each evacuee requires slightly more than i second to go through
exit, to the total time to evacuate (15 seconds) was 200 percent greater
than the 5 seconds to smoke obscuration (assume 5 seconds required to
open door/deploy slide).
Evacuation from the aft cabin is based on the following major considerations:
-- The only usable exit was the right rear door (left rear door blocked by
external fire).
-- Approximately 20 seconds of the time from slideout to complete smoke
obscuration (based on onboard cameras).
-- Assuming each evacuee requires slightly more than 1 second to go through
an exit, the total time to evacuate (33 seconds) was 65 percent greater
than the 20 seconds to smoke obscuration (assume 8 seconds required for
flight attendant to reach/open door and deploy slide).
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How many additional people could have survived and escaped through dense smoke is
highly speculative. Unfortunately, no instrumentation was installed on the
aircraft to measure temperature, smoke density, or toxic gas concentration.
Therefore, no estimate can be made as to when the cabin fire environment became
untenable.
OBSERVATIONS
Flight Plan G--Flight 014 (pilot proficiency) was successfully conducted on
November 26, 1984. Flight 015 technical briefing was conducted on November 27,
1984. On November 28, 1984, the NASA-A/DFRF FRR committee presented to the NASA-
A/DFRF senior management their findings and recommendations on the Flight 014
anomaly. Based on senior management's review, the decision was rendered to "go
with CID" as scheduled.
The AMK flushing and fueling operation, aircraft pref]ights, reconf_guration,
etc., were initiated. The crew briefing and photo briefing were conducted o,
November 30, ]984, and the alrcraft/systems operations were moved to ]akebed
runway 17. Day of Flight (DOF) Flight Plan H--Flight 015 started at 3:30 s.m.
with the ground crew and proceeded to a call-to-stations at 7:25 a.m. Winds were
reported at less than 3 knots north with a temperature of 42°F at takeoff
(approximately 9:14 a.m.). The takeoff, CID profile, and do_, to _mpact
(9:22:]1) appeared to be normal and as planned.
As previously indicated, the documentation research/post-impact (accident)
investigation teams began their investigation/analysls on CID plus 2 days. Their
investigation was completed within 5 days of work. As their work was comp]eted,
the security of the impact site was minimized, and the carcass sa]vage contractor
moved on-site.
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APPENDIXA
PARTICIPANTS
The FAA Technical Center (Atlantic City Airport, New Jersey) was responsible for
the overall conduct of the CID and was serving as the CID Pregram Manager. It
also was responsible for many of the experiments; i.e., antimisting kerosene,
crashworthlness, cabin fire safety, etc., onboard the test aircraft.
NASA's Langley Research Center (Hampton, Virginia) had crashworthiness/struc-
tural/restraint experiments on the aircraft. Its major contribution was the
development of the instrumentation/data acquisition systems (DAS) for the entire
CID.
NASA's Ames/Dryden Flight Research Facility (Edwards, California) had the respon-
sibility for the design and implementation of the remotely piloted vehicle's
flight control and guidance system. It also handled the integration of all the
experiments and system hardware that flew on the airplane. Additionally, ft did
conduct all ground and flight operations.
FAA-Ames Research Center (Moffett Field, California) was a test team member
having the responsibility for the AMK degrader system integretJon, checkout,
ground, and flight tests.
FAA headquarters (Washington, D.C.) test team members represented headquarters
management and participated in a FJight Readiness Review (FRR) team i_ the C]D
activities, and conducted the post-impact (accident) investigation experiment.
NASA headquarters (Washington, D.C.) test team members represented headquarters
management and the FRR team in the CID activities.
NASA-Ames Research Center (Moffett Field, California) participated as FRR team
member and supporting flight following aircraft support.
Each Government agency utilized industry support to the greatest extent practical
through the competitive contracting process. Formal Interagency agreements and
memorandums of agreement were in force between the FAA, NASA, Department of
Defense (DOD), and international governments. The CID team included Government
and industry participants as fol]ows:
U.S. Military Services
o U.S. Air Force
Air Force Flight Test Center (Edwards Air Force Base, California)--
Range, tracking, communications, crash fire rescue, air traffic
control (ATC), security, etc.
United States Air Force 1369th Audio Visual Squadron (DO!)
(Vandenberg Air Force Base, California)--Ground photographic/video
coverage: Manned and remote tracking
A-I
o U.S. Army
-- Air Force Flight Test Center (Edwards Air Force Base, California)--
Photographic/video coverage helicopters
o U.S. Navy
-- Naval Air Test Center (Patuxent River, Maryland)--Flight Incident
Recorder/Electronlc Locator Transmitter (FIR/ELT) experiment.
Industry support provided by:
Leigll Instruments LTD (Canada)--FIR/ELT dev_loper, test, and
support
-- USN/NavJISurface WeaponsCenter (Dalgren, VA)--Remote tracking/
radio controlled camera tracker system
-- USN/P-3Orion Squadron (Pt. MuguTest Center, California)--
P-3 Orion "Cast-A-Glance" airborne photographic/video coverage
o National Transportation Safety Board (Washlngtor, D.C.)--Flight data and
cockpit voice recorders (_)R/CVR) tape readout and analysis, and p_st-
impact investigation team member
o Department of Transportation (DOT)/_AA
-- Civil AeroMedical Institute ([CAMI] OklahomaCity, Oklahoma)--
Seat/restraint systems tests and analysis
Foreign Governments
o United Kingdom
-- Royal Aircraft Establishment--Antimlsting kerosene experiment support
and analysis
o France
-- Airbus Industrie (Toulouse)/Freneh Embassy (Washington, D.C.)--
Seat restraint system, anthropomorphic dummy, data acquis_tlon system
experiment, and structural analysis. Industry support provided by:
Dynamic Science, Incorporated (Phoenix, Arizona)--
Seat/restralnt system, dummy, instrumentation, and data
acquisition system development, integration, and
tests support
I_dustry/Additiona] Support
o Imperial Chemical Industries of America (Wilmington, Delaware)--AMK
additive (AVGARD ®) developer/supplier, samp]ing and characterization,
tests and analysis support
A-2
oo
o
o
o
o
General Electric (Evandale, Ohio)--AMK degrader program manager, design,
developer, installation, and test support
-- Garrett Pneumatic SystemsDivision (Phoenix, Arizona)--Degrader
system manufacturer, integration, and test/support
General Electric (Edwards, California)--Engine/AMK fuel degrader
instrumentation, integration, checkout, fuel analysis laboratory, and
genera]_aircraft maintenance support
Jet Propulsion Laboratory (Pasadena, California)--A_ simulation, tests,
sampling, characterization, and analysis support
JPI, Photographic Section, Ground/Airborne (Pasadena, California)--
Responsible for ground/airborne photographic/video system design,
development, integration, test, and support.
Lockheed Aircraft (Burbank, California)--"KRASH" mode] development and
analysis
Boeing Commercial Airplane Company(Seattle, Washi_gton)--"DY_:AST"mode]
development and analysis; Boeing 720 technical support
Boeing Technical Services (Seattle, Washington)--Boeing 720 technical
support
Republic ManagementSystems (Trevose, Pennsylvania)--Management of
seat/restraint system development and tests experiment (FAA) -- SI_U_A,
Incorporated (Tempe,Arizona)--Seat/restraint system development,
supplier, tests, and support; SOMTAseat model analysis
Kentron (Hampton, Virginia)--Instrumentation/data acquisition system
support
System DevelopmentCorporation (Hampton, Virginia)--Impact dynamics
computer analysis program/support
Lockheed Aircraft Services (Ontario, California)--Flight data and cockpit
voice recorder(s) systems design, integration, checkout, and test
support; and supplier of an FDR,data reduction and analysis
-- Teledyne Controls (West Los Angeles, California)--Manufacturer/
supplier for flight data acquisition unit
Fairchild Aviation Recorders/Fairchild Weston Systems, Incorporated
( )--Supplier (On load to CID) state-of-the-art _)R and
CVR;data readout and analysis
-- Sunstrand Data Control (Redmond,Washington)--Suppller (on loan to
CID) state-of-the-art FDR; data readout and analysis
-- Lear Siegler, Incorporated ( )--Supplier (on load to
CID) state-of-the-art solid state memorydevice
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DowChemical Company(Midland, Michigan)--Supplier and integrator for
hazardous materials packaging experiment(s)
-- Lawrence Packaging (Newark, NewJersey)--Suppller of experiments
Pratt and _itney Aircraft (E. Hartford, Connecticut)--B-720 propulsion
system technical support
Bendix (Long Beach, CalJfornia)--Autopilot/flight control system
techrical support
Jim Matthiesen (RedwoodCity, California)--Boelng 720 consultant, pilot,
flight engineer, ground school and simulator instructor, Bon vi-vant,
etc.
Frank SandersAircraft (Chino, Callfornia)--Tailcone frame generators
design, development and installation
Cal Ysnde]l Industries (Fontana, California)--Aircraft salvsge contractor
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CID DOCUMENTS INDEX
CID-86
-01 CID SYSTEMS CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT PLAN
-02 CID BASELINE DEFINITION
-03 CID SYSTEM DESIGN APPROACH A_ RISK ASSESSMENT
-04 CID REMOTE FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM FINAL DESIGN AND STATUS REVIEW
-05 AIRBORNE CONTROL SYSTEM DESCRIPTION: UPLINK
-06 AIRBORNE CONTROL SYSTEM DESCRIPTION: POWER DISTRIBUTION
-07 AIRBORNE CONTROL SYSTEM DESCRIPTION: LANDING GEAR
-08 AIRBORNE CONTROL SYSTEM DESCRIPTION: THROTTLES
-09 AIRBORNE CONTROL SYSTEM DESCRIPTION: NOSE GEAR STEERING
-10 AIRBORNE CONTROL SYSTEM DESCRIPTION:
-1] AIRBORNE CONTROL SYSTEM DESCRIPTION:
-12 AIRBORNE CONTROL SYSTEM DESCRIPTION:
-13 AIRBORNE CONTROL SYSTEM DESCRIPTION:
-14 AIRBORNE CONTROL SYSTEM DESCRIPTION:
-15 AIRBORNE CONTROL SYSTEM DESCRJPTION:
FLAP S
BRAKES
AUTOPILOT INTERFACE
TELEVISION SYSTEM
FLIGHT TERMINATION SYSTEM
INTERFACE WITH EXPERI_IENTS
CID-84
-01
-02
-03
-04
-05
-06
-07
-08
-09
-10
-Ii
-12
-13
-]4
-]5
-16
-17
-]8
-19
-20
-21
-22
-23
-24
-25
-26
-27
-28
-29
CID RISK ASSESSMENT OE CURRENT PROGRAM APPROACH
CID SYSTEM VALIDATION/INTEGRATJON TEST PLAN FOR JANUARY 10, 1984
CID GROUND EEFECTS ANALYSIS
CID B-720/CID FLIGHT CONTROL AND GUIDANCE SYSTEM
CID OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT
CID PROJECT OPERATIONS PLAN
CID 720/CID SIMULATION
CID SYSTEM VALIDATJON/INTEGRATION TEST PLAN FOR FEBRUARY 14, 1984
CID PB20D AUTOPILOT _INTENANCE _M]AL
CID COMBINED SYSTEM TEST PLAN FOR FEBRUARY 28, 1984
CID MISSION RUI,ES
CID FACT SHEET
CID FLIGHT ] FLIGHT CARDS
CID FLIGHT IA CARDS
CID REMOTE CONTROLLED VEHICLE LABORATORY PREFI,IGNT
CID FLIGHT 003 FLIGHT CARDS
CID FLIGHT 004 FLIGHT CARDS
CID DAS COMBINED SYSTEM TEST PLAN
CID FLIGHT 005 FLIGHT CARDS
CID DAS FUNCTIONAL TEST PLAN
CID FLIGHT 006 FLIGHT CARDS
CID COMBINED SYSTEM TEST FOR JULY ]0, 1984
CID FLIGHT 007 FLIGHT CARDS
CID FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS TEST PLAN AND ANALYSIS
CID FI,IGHT 008 FLIGHT CARDS
CID FLIGHT 009 FLIGHT CARDS
CID FLIGHT 010 FLIGHT CARDS
CID MISSION RULES: UN!_NNED FLIGHT
CID PROCEDURE LOG
-30 CID MISSION FLIGHT PLAN
-31 CID MISSION FLIGHT CARDS
-32 CID OPERATING RULES (GROUND)
-33 CID OPERATING RULES (AIRBORNE)
-34 CID COMBINED SYSTEMS TEST FDR OCTOBER 22, 1984
-35 CID FLIGHT 011 FLIGHT CARDS
-36 CID DRAWING NUMBER REFERENCE DOCUMENT
-37 CID FLIGHT 012 FLIGHT CARDS
-38 CID FLIGHT 0]3 FLIGHT CARDS
-39 CID GUIDANCE AND CONTROL VERIFICATION/VALIDATION TEST RESULTS
-40 CID FLIGHT 014 FLIGHT CARDS
-35N C,]D FI,]GHT 015 FLIGHT CARDS (UNMANNED)
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APPENDIXC
DEGRADERSYSTEMJET-A/AMKBUILD-UPPLAN
(PRELIMINARY)
The first test buildup plan assures that the following sequence of degrader runs
is followed. Tbis wl]l lead to a fully qualified degrader to perform the CID
misslon.
In order:
I. Start and run in level flight on Jet-A
2. Run through speed accels and dece]s on Jet-A
3. LANDWIT_DEGRADERRUNNINGONJET-A
4. Takeoff with degrader running on Jet-A
5. Repeat I througb _ on A_
Furthermore, the following guidelines will be met at all times:
During qualification testing, the numberof degraders running during the landings
and takeoffs wl]l be sequentially increased from I to 4.
During qualification test (] through 5 above), only one engine will be running on
A_ during all landings and takeoffs.
To implement this qua]iflcation, the following flight plan is established:
FLIGHT
Plan ENGINE Nb_IBER
I 2 3 4
C TE/JET-A TF/JET-A TO/JET-A TE/JET-A
L/JET-A
D L/JET-A TO/JET-A TO/AMK
_/J_rK @ L/JET-A
TOIJET-A TO/_MK @ TOIJET-A
LIA_X LIJFT-A LIJFT-A LIJET-A
TOIAMK TOI3ET-A TOIJET-A TO/JET-A
L/JET-A LIJET-A LIJET-A L/AMK
G* TOIAMK TOl_krK TOIAMK TOIAMK
TE = TEST
L = LAND
TO = TAKEOFF
@ = NO DEGRADER OPERATION TO SATISFY REQUIREMENT B ABOVE
G* = ENGINES QUALIFIED FOR CID ON THIS FLIGHT
NOTE: Once AMK added to a tank, AMK will always stay in that tank
Manned flights - AMK tank to engine - but can cross-feed Jet-A to engine
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APPENDIXD
TYPICALFLIGHTPLANSANDSCHEDULES
For each flight plan, there are a series of events which are required prior to
f]ight. Flight Plans C and D below are typical for the Jet-A only flight and the
first AbIKflight. Additions were identified such as Flight Readiness Review
(FRR)Committees (Ad HocNASA-Amesand FRRboard NASA-A/DFRF)Review/Meetings,
FAA/NASAflight go-ahead, etc.
Briefly described below are typical preflight plan act_vitles nnd ,_ajor test
times of that flight.
o FLIGHT PLAN C--FLIGHTS 005 AND 006
June 28-30, 1984 Degrader Systems Chocks (only)
July 2-3, ]984 Degr,lder Syste, slEny, ine R,,ns
TBD Technical Briefing (YASA-A/DFRF
management--overview of F]ight P]an C;
i.e., major flight ta.qks, mission rul_,r,,
go/no-go criteria, etc.
Procedures review for Co_l.',ined System,,:
Test (CST)
July 4, 1984 HOLIDAY
TEB Pre-CST meeting
July 6, 1984 CST--ALL systems up; _.e., yround remote
control cockpit, control room, an_
aircraft/ experiments -- step-by-step
dress rehearsal of Flight Plan C
July 7, 1984 Pre-f] ight Engines
July 9, 1984 Pre-flight Aircraft (includJnF fuel]
TBD Crew brief-final procedures and f]J_ht
plan review
July I0 & 12, 1984 - FliF_hts 005 and 006
Major Test Items
I. Takeoff-degrader on Jet-A, Engine Number 3
2. Fuel degrader tests Jet-A, Engines 1, 2, and 4
3. Ground effects tests
4. Airspeed calibrations
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o6.
7.
8.
August 3, 1984
Major Test Items
Langley experiments checks (DAS/camera system)
CID profiles - remote piloted vehicle (RPV) control
Land - degrader on - Jet-A engine number 2
Flight termination shutdown
o FLIGHT PLAN D - FLIGHT 007
- Post-flight Plan C
- Systems/experiment anomaly malntenance/repair-- aircraft,
systems, or experiment squawks, failures, d_screpan¢ies,
ere.
AMK blender set-up and checkout
Blend AMK fuel, sample, characterize
Flight Readiness Review (prior to first AMK flight)
Technical Briefing
_MK/degrader systems checks
Flight configuration degrader/engine ground runs
CST
Pre-fllght engines
Pre-flight aircraft (including fuel)
Crew Brief
Flight 007
i. Takeoff degrader on - AMK Engine Number 3; Jet-A Engine Number 2
2. Fuel degraders tests - AMK Engines 2 and 3; Jet-A Engines I and 4
3. CID profiles - RPV control
4. Approach to Runway 25
5. Land Runway 22 - Airborne Control - Degraders on - #d_K Engine Number 2; Jet-A
Engines I and 4
6. Takeoff Runway 22 - RPV control - degraders off
7. Land Runway 22 - RPV control - degraders off
8. Remote Pilot (PP) ground operations; i.e., _ose wheel steering and brakes
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9. Remote engine shutdown
August 13, 1984
Major Test Items
o FLIGHT PLAN E
Post-flight Plan D
Systems/experlment anomaly maintenance/repair
Blend AMK fuel, sample, characterize
Technical brief
AMK/degrader systems checks
Flight configuration degrader/engine ground runs
CST
Pre-flight engines
Pre-flight aircraft (_ncluding fuel)
Crew brief
Flight
I. Takeoff - remote pilot - degrader off - Runway 22
2. Land - remote pilot - degraders off - Runway 22
3. Takeoff - airborne control - degraders on - AMK Engine Number 2;
Jet-A Engines ], 3, and 4
4. Fuel degrader tests - AM]( Engines 1 and 2; Jet-A Engine 4
5. CID profiles RP control
6. Approach to Runway 25
7. Land Runway 25 - degraders off - RPV control
8. Configure for RP operation on lakebed
9. Takeoff - remote pilot
i0. CID profile RP control
11. Land - degraders on - AM]( Engire Number I; Jet-A Engines 2, 3, and 4
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o FLIGHT PLAN F
August 27, 1984
Major Test Items
Post-flight Plan E
Systems/experiment anomaly maintenance/repair
Blend AMK fuel, sample, characterize
Technical brief
AMK/degrader systems checks
Flight configuration degrader/engine ground runs
CST
Pre-flight engines
Pre-flight aircraft (including fuel)
Crew brief
Flight
i. Takeoff - remote pilot - degraders off - Runway 22
2. Land - remote pilot - degraders off - Runway 22
3. Take off - airborne control - degraders on - AMK Engine Number ];
Jet-A Engines 2, 3, and 4
4. Fuel degrader tests - AMK Engines 1 and 4; Jet-A Engines 2 and 3
5. CID profl]es RP control
6. Approach to Runway 25
7. Land Runway 25 - degraders off - RPV control
8. Configure for RP operation on lakebed
9. Takeoff - remote pilot - degraders off - Runway 16
I0. CID profile RP control
]I. Land airborne control - degraders on - AMK Engine Number 4;
Jet-A Engines I, 2, and 3
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o FLIGHT PLAN G - FINAL "MANNED" FLIGHT
- Post-fllght Plan F
- Systems/experiment anomaly maintenance/repair aircraft,
systems, or experiment squawks, fsi]ures, discrepancies,
etc.
- A_ b]ender set-up and checkout
- Blend _MK fue], sample, characterize
- Flight Readiness Review (prior to f_nal AMK flight)
- Technical briefing
- AM_/degrader system checks
- FLight configuration degrader/engine ground runs
- CST
- Pre-flJ ght engines
- Pre-flight aircraft (including rue])
- Crew brief
This sequence of events wi]] follow tile Flight Plan D sequence of events. The
FRR Committees (Ad Hoc Ames and A/DFRF Board) will meet, deliberate, and provide
their findings and recommendations to the CID program, A/DFRF Site Manager (Marty
Knutson), and subsequently his recommendations to Dr. Bill Ballhaus, Director,
NASA-Ames. At sometime prior to Flight Plan G, Dr. Bs]lhaus would apprise NASA
and FAA management of the state of readiness for F]ight Plans G and H, and
genera]ly solicit their concurrence.
September i, 1984 - FLIGHT G - WINDOW OPENS
Major Flisht Items - manned
i. Takeoff - remote pilot - degraders off Runway 17
2. CID profile - RP control
3. Land - remote pilot - degraders off - Runway 22
4. Configure for CID mission
o FLIGHT PLAN H - CID
The original Flight Plans G and H objectives were to accomplish a complete
manned dress rehearsal of the CID mission (FLight Plan GO; if successful with
minimum anomalies, remove the crew, reconfigure for "unmanned" flight/CID
mission.
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As each flight plan currently progresses, the magnitude of the logistics of an
hour or two turn-around from G to H with an all-up status of all ground
facilities, and aircraft, systems, and experiment, being required, it is not
clearly obvious that this objective can be satisfied. A comprehensive review of
all the final pieces of the CID is in progress, and may not be in place until
Flight Plan F.
FLIGHTH
CID Mission - Unmanned
i. Tskeoff - remote pilot - AMK/degraderson - Runway17
2. Perform CID
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APPENDIX E
CID PILOT/CREW REPORT
The following report is provided by the CID RPV pilot, flight test engineer, and
the remote control vehicle laboratory supervisor:
Introduction. This was the fifteenth flight of the CID Test Program l,ut was
the first and only flight to be flown without a safety crew onboard. Tile
flight objectives were to remotely fly the B-720 aircraft from ]akebed
runway 17 and climb to approximately 2,300 feet above the ground while
positioning the airplane on the racetrack pattern inside the designated
sterile area. It was then to be flo_ around the racetrack and onto the
final approach where a northerly descent would be started to allow the
airplane to impact the ground just prior to the gravel s]Jdeout area. It
was then expected to slide into cutters which wo,]d rt,pture the wings and
create a fuel spillage. The flight was completed im the manner descr_led.
Preflight, En$ine Start, and Final Checks. The cockpit sett, p and entwine
starts were done by the onboard crew of Tom McMurtry (pilot), VJc Holton
(flight engineer), and Buzz Sa_D, er (technician). The checks and engJnP
starts appeared to go efficiently and w_thout any significant problems. The
onboard cre_nembers started to evacuate the airplane at 5 minutes pr_c,r tc_
the planned takeoff. There was a minor delay in getting clearance fo_
takeoff since the security personnel had to assure that everyone was out (,f
the sterile area. The two photo helicopters, the King Air safety chase, and
the Navy P-3 photo airplane were airborne and ready to support the mission,
and then NASA One Control Room gave the clearance for takeoff.
Takeoff and Initial Climb. Following a countdown, the brakes were released
and the throttles gradually increased to takeoff power of approximately 2.66
EPR. The throttles were bo]ted together for this flight and that caused a
minor variation between engine power settings. The elevatc_r trim started to
move slightly nose down from the 2.5 degree setting as the airplane
accelerated, but a small aft movement of the stick slowed the trim movement,
and therefore, it caused no problem.
The acceleration appeared to be normal and the airplane was steered down
Lakebed Runway 17 t_sing the rudder pedal steering system. The steering was
quite sensitive and some minor directional deviations resulted during the
first part of the roll. The color TV installed in the nose of the a_rplane
had less contrast than on some previous flights but provided an adequate
picture.
At speed of 80 knots, the nose when steering was disengaged, and thereafter,
aerodynamic rudder control was used to provide directlona] control. It was
quite effective and completely satisfactory. The calculated VI, V 2 speeds
were set about 10 knots fast to allow more speed margin during the rotation
and takeoff. At VR, the stick was moved gently aft between V R and V2. but
the rate was noticeably slower. Liftoff was very close to the V 2 speed of
151 knots, and the airplane climbed away nicely.
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Using the attitude gyro and the TV picture, the pitch attitude for climb
could be held relatively constant. After assuring that a positive rate of
climb was continuing and that the hydraulic pressure was normal, the landing
gear was selected up. The flaps stayed at 30 degrees throughout the flight.
Uponreaching 200 feet above ground level (AGL), a left turn to 120 degrees
heading was started and the engine power reduced to approximately 2.35 EPR.
The airplane climbed to 4,600 meansea level (MSL) (2,300 feet AGL). A
small right aileron trim bias had to be set in to maintain a constant
]leading. This resulted in about one or two degrees of indicated right bank
angle. The error was thought to be a result of gyro precession during the
takeoff. Tbis bank angle error, even though small, was distracting as it
had been on previous flights.
Racetrack Pattern. Using tile raw data and steering bar needles, the
airplane was established southbound on the desired downwind leg at
approximately 4,600 feet MSI. The guidance system allowed the track and
altitude to be closely held. E_ile flying straight away on the downwind,
the aileron trim bias had to be adjusted again to hold a constant heacling.
Base Le$. As the base leg was approached, the vertical steering bar moved
right to command a right turn. However, once the airplane had been rolled
into the turn, the airplane would drift outside the track if the steering
bar was held centered. In order to hold the desired track while turning the
bank, angle had to be increased until the vertical steering bar was
approximately I/2 inch left of center. This was similar to conditions
experienced on previous flights and caused no real problems.
Final Approach. Turning onto the final approach, the target area and the
lead-ln line on the ground could be seen on the TV screen, but the contrast
was low and the picture was not as clear as on some flights. When the
"terminal guidance" became active, the airplane was nose down to intercept
the desired glldeslope. As the glldeslope was intercepted, the pitch
attitude was adjusted to place the TV boreslght X on the orange panel of the
target area fence. Instead of holding the glldeslope, the airplane drifted
low and had to be flown back up to the glldeslope. It was also determined
that the raw g]ides]ope indicator and the pitch steering bar had minor
indication errors. Several oscillations up and down through the glideslope
allowed an approximate calibration to be made. The autothrottle held the
speed very close to 146 knots while coming down the final.
While making the glldeslope and pitch adjustments, the airplane drifted
slightly right of the center llne, and a correction to the left was made.
When passing 200 feet altitude, the airplane was still slightly right of
center and a go-around was considered, but there seemed to be enough
altitude to correct back. The concern expressed many times by senior
engineering personnel and Flight Readiness Review (FRR) Board members about
the lack of redundancy in the overall control system was certainly a factor
in the decision to continue and make the touchdown on the first attempt.
The ground rules required a continuation after reaching 150 feet, and the
flight test engineer activated the remotely controlled instrumentation at
that altitude.
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The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) conducted a full-scale air-to-surface impact-survivable
"impact demonstration" with a remotely piloted transport aircraft on
December !, !_84, at Edwards Air Force Base, California° The test article
consisted of experiments, special equipments, and supporting systems, such as
antimisting kerosene (AMK), crashworthiness structuraI/restraint, analytical
modeling, cabin fire safety, flight data recorders, post-impact investigation,
instrumentation/data acquisition systems, remotely piloted vehicle/fiight
control systems, range and flight safety provisions, etc.
This report describes the aircraft, experiments, systems, activit_es, and events
which !ead up to the Controlled Impact Demonstration (CID). An overview of the
final "mnmanned" remote contro! flight and sequence of _mpact events a_e
de!ine_ted_ Preliminary post CID observations are presented°
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